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Three arrows 
cannoT be broken!
A study of Abenomics’ third stage
of structural reforms
Josse Jackson Jakobsen
Summary: This thesis offers a unique insight into the LDP and Shinzu Abe’s prospects of 
pushing Abenomics’ third arrow of structural reform. Based on the newest literature, recent 
lectures, press conferences and seminars as well as several interviews with Japanese bureau-
crats, industry representatives and experts, this thesis provides new context-specific data to 
the debate on Abenomics. Two specific structural reforms are studied and based on these the 
thesis indicates what drivers and obstacles affect if the state is able to take the next reformist 
step and bring Japan back from two lost decades of economic stagnation.
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Japan is back ...?
When we are no longer able to change a situation, we are challenged to 
change ourselves. – Viktor E. Frankl
Once upon a time, Japan emerged from the ruins of World War II to become the second largest 
economy in the world. The relatively small island nation developed a booming economy, exer-
cised technological leadership and enjoyed accelerating exports. Once upon a time, reformers 
turned to Japan for inspiration. The Japanese fairytale of once upon a time evaporated with 
the bursting of its economic bubble in the early 1990s. Japan has ever since descended into 
a quagmire of economic stagnation, deflation, low inward Foreign Direct Investment and the 
highest public debt among OECD countries, around 240% of GDP. Granted, Japan is still a major 
player on the global marketplace; yet the state has not managed to dig itself out of its stagnant 
economy. This is the story we have been told over and over again. However, for the past year 
the world press, academics and political community have been discussing whether Japan is 
back.1 
In December 2012 the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by Shinzo Abe returned to power 
in Lower House elections followed, a few months later, by a significant victory in the Upper 
House of the Diet. Since this first victory, significant reforms have been passed, originally 
named Three Arrows of Economic Growth after the old Japanese folktale.2 
The story of the three arrows is a story of strength in the whole. The story begins in an era 
of arrows and samurais when a Japanese lord named Mouri Montonari had three sons. One 
day the lord called his sons to his side. He gave them each an arrow and asked them to break 
it. Each easily accomplished the task. Mouri then gave each son three arrows. They tried with 
all their strength to break them but miserably failed. The lord then explained: whilst one arrow 
is easily overcome, three arrows together cannot be broken.3
The first two arrows of the incoming LDP government’s economic strategy were quickly 
implemented. As shall be seen in Chapter 3, these involved a massive fiscal stimulus and more 
aggressive monetary easing together with a change in direction at the Bank of Japan. The 
measures quickly lead to significant economic growth, a 20% depreciation of the yen and 
a strengthening of the Nikkei Index by 40% during the first half of 2013. Additionally Japan 
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entered into significant free trade negotiations with the European Union, the United States 
and the wider Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) which, if successful, will increase Japan’s GDP 
significantly. The reforms, later dubbed Abenomics, caught the attention of the world and the 
question emerged: is Japan back?
However, in June the government presented the third and crucial arrow of its reform policy 
– structural reforms – which indeed were named Japan is back. Less than lukewarm reviews 
were received and the stock market reacted accordingly. It should be noted, however, these 
structural reforms were presented only weeks before the Upper House elections; this might 
explain the Prime Minister’s vague presentation at the time. It is generally believed by formu-
lators of the growth strategy that the Cabinet and Abe would go much further after the Upper 
House election. Indeed, the Abe government won the Upper House election by a solid majority 
of 135 out of 242. Members of the Diet are still deliberating the third arrow in greater detail.4
Here, Policy Director Bjorn Kongstad at the European Business Council in Japan notes: for 
the first time in a long time, since Koizumi stepped down, Japan now at least has the chance 
to change.5 Seemingly by controlling both houses of the Diet, Prime Minister Abe has a unique 
opportunity to pass significant structural reforms. However, to date we are still waiting for 
such change to happen. While it is too soon to judge the success of Abenomics, it is interesting 
to dig a bit deeper and investigate the state’s ability to push through such reforms. This might 
give us some indication of the prospects for passing the significant structural reforms that are 
necessary if Japan indeed is actually to ‘come back’.
Even though the third arrow was criticised for its lack of an actual action plan, some re-
forms have already been adopted. These reforms were underway long before the Abe Govern-
ment came to power but they are nonetheless part of the third arrow’s growth strategy and 
represent the first step towards presumably a long line of structural reforms. Most significant 
here has been the Electricity Market Reform: a liberalisation and legal unbundling of the of 
the electricity market. Also significant is the amendment to the Companies Act, which seeks to 
better the corporate governance regime and thus promote investment. These two examples 
of structural reform and their outcomes can indicate the state’s ability to push through such 
reform in the current Japanese political climate. Foreign companies, states and international 
organisations have all called for Japan to open up its markets and adopt international practic-
es.6 Bjorn Kongstad however clarifies: We say, perhaps, that maybe here we have our chance, 
for European companies or US companies, but those who perhaps have the biggest potential 
is Japanese society. Because trade is like breathing, where export is exhaling and import [and 
inward investment] is inhaling. You cannot just breathe out; you need to breathe in as well.7
With a mounting debt and stagnant economy, Japan must change its ways to survive as 
a significant economy in the ever-changing global marketplace. Whether Japan follows the 
advice of the international community or finds its own way is not the concern of this thesis. 
Rather, first and foremost the question must be: to what extent is the Abe administration able 
to pass such structural reforms. To this end it will examine the limits on the Japanese state’s 
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decision-making abilities and analyse these against the backdrop of more than two decades of 
failure to pass necessary structural reforms. This thesis therefore asks the question: 
What is the Japanese government’s prospect of pursuing the third arrow of 
Abenomics through significant structural reform?
It is too soon to evaluate Abenomics as a whole; its success or failure belongs to the fu-
ture. This does not mean we cannot already seek to understand the complex process in which 
the reforms are formulated and how the state is constrained in its decision-making, however, 
especially as knowledge of the eventual outcome may overshadow any later analysis. Indeed, 
undertaking this analysis now can already cast some light on Japan’s prospects of turning its 
economy around. As such, this study aims to offer a unique insight into what the prospects are 
for significant structural reforms to be passed and, based on such conclusions, indicate if the 
state is able to take the next reformist step. As the Japanese folktale claims, three arrows can-
not be broken. In a sense, however, the question posed by this thesis is if Abe has the strength 
of the third arrow to create unbreakable results.
Notes
1 Vogel, 2007: 1, Al-Badri, 2013: 1&9; Fukuda et al, 04/06/2013: IMF seminar; Yoshino, 23 August 2013: GRIPS 
Lecture; Dallara, 02/09/2013: FCCJ Press Conference; Sachs, 04/06/2013: FCCJ Press Conference; Financial 
Times 1: 02/01/2012; JP Times 1: LA 5/2/2013; Halla, 25/07/2013; Economist 1, 18/05/2013; Economist 2, 
09/11/2013; USTR 1: 06/11/2013; Europolitics 1: 15/11/2013; Diplomat 1: 31/12/2013; OECD 1: 2013; Patrick, 
23/09/2013: 1-3 and WTO 1
2 Halla, 25/07/2013 and Xu, 16/10/2013
3 Web 1 and Web 2 
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Kantei: 1, 01/2014: 11 and Economist 4: 27/07/2013 
5 Kongstad: 01:01:41
6 Vogel, 2007: 11 and Kantei 1, 01/2014: 3, 6&18
7 Kongstad: 00:38:52
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The quest for answers: Structure, perception, approach, 
empirical data and theory
There are things known and there are things unknown, and in between are 
the doors of perception – Aldous Huxley
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a study of current change in Japanese structural re-
forms with a view to reaching a better understanding how the Japanese state might achieve 
its objectives when pursuing Abenomics’ third arrow of structural reforms, as seen in figure 
1. As noted above the situation at present is too uncertain for such conclusions to be drawn. 
However, through case study analysis it is possible to indicate if the Japanese state is capable 
of pursuing such reform now and in the future. To this end, the thesis is signified by an in-
ductive, exploratory, case study analysis. These cases are respectively the Electricity Market 
Reform and amendment of the Companies Act. In the coming sections this chapter will outline 
the thesis’ nature of being (i.e. ontology) and its nature of knowledge (epistemology) which 
will in turn delimit the analysis’ subject matter. It will also present the analysis’ structure and 
scientific perception, then outline the thesis’ approach to the empirical data and lastly present 
the theoretical framework behind the analysis.
Structure of AnAlySiS
The structure of the analysis will not only be the red thread for the thesis’ later conclusions but 
also present a macro–micro–macro strategy to produce such results.
chapter 3: This outlines the current situation in Japan in relation to Abenomics, focusing on 
the economic environment leading up to the introduction of Abenomics, the nature and goals 
of the three-arrows policy and what immediate reactions there have been to it.
chapter 4: This is the first case study, of the electricity market reform, and focuses on the re-
lationship between industry and state, both historically in the context of the electricity market 
as well as in the legislative process leading up to the formulated reform. Its aim is to illuminate 
the different interests at stake both historically and during the recent decision-making process, 
thereby assessing the state’s ability to pass structural reforms.
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chapter 5: The second case study, of the amendment to the Companies Act, follows much the 
same structure as the previous case analysis, focusing on the relationship between industry 
and the state, both historically in the context of the corporate governance regime as well as 
the legislative process leading up to the formulated reform.
chapter 6: This analyses the conclusions drawn from both case studies, looking to compare 
empirical realities to the outline given in chapter 3. In particular, the analytical discussion will 
examine what capabilities and constraints the state has when pursuing the third arrow of Abe-
nomics. From this analysis, it will outline which variables impact state decision-making in the 
context of Abenomics and also reflect upon the analytical framework presented in the chapter.
chapter 7: On the basis of the foregoing analysis and outlined tendencies, this chapter will 
reach the final conclusions and thus answer the above research question, outlining which 
variables affect the state’s prospects of pushing its third-arrow structural reform, now and in 
the future.
PercePtion: the forceS of chAnge
The basis of this study is an empirical inquiry into the dynamics of Japanese structural reform 
processes in order to understand the Abe government’s prospects of passing its third arrow of 
Abenomics. The thesis therefore adopts an empirical exploratory approach to understand the 
underlying mechanisms or “beneath the surface” dynamics of these specific reform outcomes. 
It is, however, problematic merely to analyse the current status quo and ignore the historic 
linkages that give context to the current state of play. As such, this thesis will examine the 
historical context to each case study as it relates to the subject matter.
A core argument among some liberal reformers has been that if only the government 
would pull back, then markets would flourish.1 However, the necessity for governments to 
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foster institutions that can sustain market competition is critical for markets to flourish. As 
with US and Western European institutions, Japanese institutions are shaped through partici-
pants’ interactions which in turn determine the trajectory of change. However, change does 
not merely involve units colliding with each other and their structures; to change you need to 
break something down, Kongstad concludes.2 As change also involves breaking with old struc-
tures, the question becomes twofold: to which degree are the old structures broken down and 
which forces have resulted in outcomes of change or non-change?3 
Associate professor Mark S. Manger has dedicated much of his professional career to 
researching the Japanese political economy and associated policy. He offers three stories to 
explain the forces of change or non-change which in turn affect state decision-making. These 
are:
1. Japan is no different and it is just that interests groups have different interests in Japan.4 
The question then becomes, who are these interest groups within the given subject mat-
ter? The analysis of interest groups influencing policy was famously put forward by George 
Stigler, who argued that smaller groups, as producers with the most interest in the given 
policy, will more effectively push their agenda forward towards regulators and thus con-
strain their decision-making ability. Sam Peltzman departs from the same viewpoint but 
argues that there are mutable interests between different groups, all competing for influ-
ence on such reforms. From these perceptions emerged other theories that to a greater 
or lesser degree assign interest groups with power to influence reform. However, such an 
analysis focuses on such groups more or less in isolation.5
2. The other story could be that [decision-making] is driven by bureaucrats for their own 
reasons.6 Theories that have captured this analysis have been based, among others, on 
principle-agent relationship theory, e.g. Barry Weigast. Scholars such as Mark Tilton, Fran-
cesco Paolo Cerase and former PM Yasuhiro Nakasone have especially argued that bureau-
crats play a central role in the Japanese decision-making process. Thus such an analysis 
would focus on bureaucrats’ ability to alter the scope of reform. On the other hand, Yves 
Tiberghien has pointed to both industry and international forces as variables explaining 
change through structural reform.7
3. Lastly, the old story [is] that whenever there is international pressure then Japan liberalises. 
So if nothing changes first and something changes in the EU–Japan trade negotiations, then 
you know it is because of international pressure.8 However, Frenk Withoos, Vice President 
of ABB Japan, also commented: Sometimes to make a change from a Japanese perspective 
... it is somehow good that you are forced from outside. ... It is a blaming thing.9 Manger 
follows up on this point, elaborating that much literature has pointed to foreign pressure 
pushing policy forward though often resulting in token reforms – i.e., reforms that show 
change on paper but lack real impact.10 Such an analysis would in turn focus on the degree 
of foreign influence.
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As mentioned above, this thesis will adopt an exploratory approach when seeking to under-
stand how the state is constrained in its decision-making ability. The points presented above 
illuminate the core discussion that has been presented in the literature on Japan’s regulatory 
reforms. Both Vogel and Manger agree it might not be a question of industry, bureaucracy or 
international pressure alone; rather, it is a combination of all factors at work.11 This study, then, 
is not centred on why change occurs but rather on how the state is constrained when seeking to 
implement structural reform. Hence the analysis will focus first on ideas of the state and then 
investigate how it is impacted. It is thus necessary to determine the impact that specific actors 
have on state decision-making, though to focus on one variable would limit the study unneces-
sarily. Nevertheless by understanding the events leading up to such reforms it is possible to 
include the relevant participants accordingly. Even though some of the literature distinguishes 
between different state actors, the bureaucracy will be investigated as part of the state and 
not as an external actor impacting on the state. As Manger also concludes, It is very hard to 
really tell the full story ... you cannot without spending an awful lot of time in [Japan].12 It is 
not, in other words, within the limits of this thesis to make such a distinction, nor does it seem 
necessary to do so, as these reforms in particular have stretched over the lifetime of different 
governments. However, the point made above should not be ignored. The intentions of the 
government’s political leadership and of the ministries within it can indeed be different; this 
the literature has also proven. This observation will therefore be an underlining factor in the 
analysis, though it should be stressed that together bureaucrats and politicians form the state. 
The analysis will focus on the bureaucrats, as it is them who are the initial decision-makers, 
moderators, negotiators and formulators of legislation in Japan. It is thus more interesting to 
understand how industry impacts on the decision-making of a given ministry.
Apart from industry, it was seen above that international influences can also affect the out-
come of structural reform, whether as pressure to open up markets and adopt international 
practices or the absorption of foreign ideas that have significantly shaped Japanese institu-
tions and their ideas of reform. However, these have been a constant variable. Therefore the 
ability for Japan to reform during the 1990s and now would seemingly be the same if this was 
the only variable. On the other hand, recently initiated free trade agreements (FTA) should 
not be ignored, as electricity, corporate governance and other subjects connected to the third 
arrow of Abenomics indeed could be negotiated. However, as noted by Manger, if sudden 
change would occur parallel to such negotiations being concluded or shifting in focus, specula-
tion could indeed be in play. To date nothing indicates this, even though corporate governance 
has been a negotiation point for the US; as will be seen in chapter 5, it seems not to have 
had a huge impact on the outcome of reform. Arguably the domestic variables are far more 
important to understand, as these interests can shift with the changing structural environ-
ment. To this effect Hall and Soskice suggest that industry and government are likely to adjust 
to changing conditions by attempting to preserve institutional advantages. In other words, the 
structural changes surrounding the participants should not be ignored. On the other hand, 
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pressure from foreign actors will not be ignored in the analysis but it will play a less significant 
role as these interests are seen as a constant variable.13 
This study’s analysis is, then, twofold. Not only does it examine the participants’ impact 
on state formulation of reform but also what surrounding structures affect these participants. 
Thus in both case studies the recurrent question will be: how does the reform as finally formu-
lated explain the state’s ability to pass structural reform? The above perceptions shape both 
the thesis’ theoretical framework and its presentation and interpretation of empirical data.
APProAch
The third arrow of Abenomics presented in June 2013 was both comprehensive and vague in 
content. An analysis of the package could equally be vague and comprehensive. One response 
to this dilemma would be to wait; more details would become apparent, outcomes known 
and a historical analysis possible. But the problem is that these structural reforms are being 
initiated incrementally; a broad overview is not that easy to obtain. Moreover, I would argue 
that analysing the decision-making as it occurs may be chaotic but the shifts in power and 
attitudes are more easily seen. Once a policy initiative has succeeded or failed, knowledge of 
its outcome influences what participants remember of the whole process. As such, analysing 
events as they happen could be said to have greater predictive power than a purely historical 
approach. In turn the thesis’ analysis and later conclusions will be of an inductive nature, 
outlining indicators of the state’s prospects to push significant structural reform. Choosing the 
right case study is of course essential for the validity of this method.14
The two case studies presented in this thesis – Electricity Market Reform and amendment 
of the Companies Act – were not chosen randomly. Essentially, there were four third-arrow 
reforms* already underway but it was soon clear only two options were viable.15
Agricultural reform. The government will abolish the rice production regulation scheme (Gen-
tan) through which for the past 40 years it has provided rice farmers with subsidies. While 
not underestimating the significance of the reform, three issues emerged. First, the bill is only 
expected to be submitted to the Diet during 2014. Second, access to informants would have 
been difficult as in the agricultural sector contacts are usually made by personal introduc-
tion. Last, choosing agricultural reform as a case risked having the study run into a dead end 
because the agricultural sector is renowned for being protected, especially by the LDP. The 
risk was that it would not show how the state is affected in its decision-making ability as 
the change in legislation is unclear, data collection would be impaired and general issues of 
transparency are present.16
revision of the Pharmaceutical Affairs law. Here, the government permitted the online sale 
of non-prescription drugs. The law was passed by the Diet on 5 December 2013 and will come 
* Several other reforms have been initiated, e.g. the introduction of National Strategic Special Zones but, 
because details are unclear at present, these are not investigated further.
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into effect during 2014. The revision represents a smaller step to create new markets within 
the pharmaceutical sector as part of the government growth strategy. Speculation has been 
if the revision’s main aim is more to better the healthcare system than promote economic 
growth. Despite being assumedly accessible and part of Abe’s growth strategy, the revision is 
not significant enough to help assess the overall prospects for Abenomics’ third arrow. In addi-
tion, it would be problematic to analyse a case whose main goal seems to be other than market 
or economically motivated. The case study’s validity would thus be significantly undermined.17
electricity Market reform. The government has passed the first stage of a comprehensive 
reform intending to liberalise and legally unbundle the electricity market. The reform repre-
sents the most significant reform of this sector in over 50 years and is a clear reaction to the 
triple disaster of March 2011. The case was chosen for five reasons. First, the reform has been 
approved by all relevant stakeholders including the Diet. Second, it represents a significant 
change to the electricity market’s structure as initially presented. Third, it seeks to liberalise 
and open up the market, hence is in line with the government’s intention to promote growth. 
Fourth, as advisory council deliberations have been concluded, access to empirical data and 
interviewees has been easier. Last, the reform, which seeks to fully open the electricity market 
to the private sector rather than limiting it to the current 10 monopolies,18 is representative of 
the overall third arrow growth strategy: to restore confidence in the Japanese economy and 
unleash the power of the private sector to the fullest extent.19
Amendment of the companies Act. This measure seeks to strengthen corporate governance 
as well as promote inwards investment. The amendment was submitted to the Diet on 29 
November 2013 and is expected to be passed during the first quarter of 2014. Even though it is 
not yet law, the amendment has been approved by the Cabinet, which represents the majority 
in both houses. In addition, two main external stakeholders; the Keidanren and Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, have formally approved the amendment as finally agreed. It is thus highly unlikely 
this bill will not pass the Diet. The case has been chosen for the following reasons: First, it 
should soon pass the Diet. Second, it changes the current corporate governance regime. Third, 
the aim is to move towards the international standard of corporate governance, an approach 
in line with the third arrows’ growth strategy. Fourth, access to empirical data is higher as 
advisory council deliberations have been concluded, enabling interviews with relevant actors. 
Last, the case is representative of the overall third-arrow economic growth strategy, which 
seeks to restore economic confidence and promote investments.20
In contrast to the first two reforms presented above, the two latter offer substance, access and 
relevance to the study’s subject matter. Both cases are representative cases that exemplify the 
broader category of Abenomics. That said, the thesis does ignore certain third-arrow aims, 
such as increasing the female workforce. However, the overall goal of implementing growth-
enhancing reforms dealing with a stagnant economy and a strong yen should be considered 
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the largest and most immediate area of the reform.* A case study is by definition a means 
to analyse a small area of a greater whole. The benefit is therefore that the conclusion will 
be able to demonstrate the underlying mechanisms and structures in greater detail than can 
be reached by adopting a quantitative analysis of a broader sample. The analysis will thus 
undertake a detailed mapping of the processes in which outcomes are produced and indicate 
how the state is constrained when pursuing future structural reforms. Both cases will also be 
approached historically to explain underlying relationships and structures. A further delimita-
tion is taken by also focusing on areas of the two reforms characterised by dispute. In conclu-
sion, the analysis follows the case study method, this being the most appropriate approach to 
the subject matter. In line with Flyveberg, this thesis shares the understanding that the social 
sciences need to adopt appropriate method from the view of the research question’s subject 
matter rather than shaping the subject matter after a specific method.21
eMPiricAl dAtA
The principle of the subject matter adopting appropriate method requires however the avail-
ability of valid sources of data. The timely nature of Abenomics and hence the two case studies 
made it necessary to conduct several interviews. This thesis draws on ten interviews con-
ducted in different formats: in person with consecutive interpretation, in person in English, via 
email and by video conference. This section will outline the different methods, difficulties and 
validities of the different data sources with a special focus on these interviews.
qualitative interviews provide timely and context-specific data. In the analysis of both the 
amendment to the Companies Act and the Electricity Market Reform, they provided a unique 
insight into the decision-making process that the analysis could not have done without. The 
focus of these interviews was on the interviewees’ responses to open-ended questions. These 
in turn were structured through interview-guides† specifically designed to let the interviewee 
respond in ways that I could not have predicted, though still structured around the interview’s 
unique purpose. This contrasts with the quantitative study, where data collection is from a 
larger pool of subjects but it involves limiting the range of answers; what is created is a larger 
but more superficial data set. Because it was neither appropriate nor possible to conduct a 
study and draw conclusions based on mere yes and no responses, I opted for a delimited field 
of case study. Here, the thesis concurs with Riis who argues it is essential for the interviewer 
to be part of the qualitative study when seeking a deeper understanding of the subject area.22 
The following interviews were conducted:
Mark Manger was interviewed as an expert researcher of Japan’s political economy and re-
lated reforms. He is currently an assistant professor at the University of Toronto and is mainly 
focused on international political economy, trade and macroeconomic policies in the Asia 
* This point will be additionally reiterated in the coming chapter, which outlines Abenomics in greater detail.
† Interview guides and email correspondence can be found in Appendix 1
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Pacific with a special focus on Japan. He has thus conducted many interviews with Japanese 
politicians, bureaucrats and members of industry, publishing much on the subject. Note that 
Manger was not interviewed for his empirical knowledge on Abenomics but rather his vast 
knowledge of political economic reforms and his experience in conducting interviews with 
Japanese industry, bureaucrats and others.23
the Keidanren is in general terms the most influential and powerful interest organisation for 
the industry in Japan. It has about 1,300 members from businesses across Japan plus an ad-
ditional 121 domestic industry associations. Its declared mission is to support Japan’s corporate 
interests and the self-sustainment of the Japanese economy.24 Both respondents were at senior 
management level (one in the Environmental Policy Bureau, the other in the Business Infra-
structure Bureau) and are highly knowledgeable of either the amendment to the Companies 
Act or Electricity Market Reform. Both spoke on behalf of the Keidanren but made it clear their 
interpretation of the organisation’s position on the reforms was subjective. While I was not 
asked to preserve their anonymity, I have chosen to do so out of respect. The conclusions I have 
drawn should in no way imply their agreement. Both interviews were conducted in English.
the federation of electrical Power companies of Japan (fePc) has since 1952 represented 
the ten electricity power companies. This business organisation has been the common voice 
for the electricity industry and has promoted several activates related to electricity over the 
years. The interview with six senior persons from the FEPC was conducted with Japanese/Eng-
lish consecutive interpretation. All participants had had dealings with the Electricity Market 
Reform and represented the organisation at the time of the interview. For the same reasons as 
above, I have chosen to preserve their anonymity.
the tokyo Stock exchange (tSe) is one of the largest stock exchanges in the world. The in-
terview was conducted after my return to Denmark and thus was conducted via email. This 
different format limited the empirical product and thus to a lesser degree has been utilised 
in the coming analysis. However, the TSE responses have given a valuable insight into their 
stance on the amendment of the Companies Act; this could not have been established through 
other empirical sources. The validity of responses was strengthened by the participation of 
several respondents in answers that likely were also cross-checked. The answers should thus 
be considered the official position of the TSE. Correspondence with the TSE can be seen in 
Appendix 2.
the Ministry of economy, trade and industry (Meti), electricity Market reform office has 
been responsible for the formulation of the Reform. The two respondents were directly in-
volved in the formulation and decision-making process prior to submission to the cabinet. The 
interview was conducted in English with one member and via Japanese/English consecutive in-
terpretation with the other. It should be noted that Japanese bureaucrats are more frequently 
promoted and hence transferred than is seen in other countries. Manger also commented 
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on this issue, saying: “You are talking to someone for half an hour and then you find out that 
they weren’t actually there when the whole thing happened and it is just the official version 
that they are telling you and that is very frustrating.”25 In this specific interview the relevant 
person had been working on the reform for some time. In addition, because it was recent, 
all respondents to a some degree had been involved directly. This interview has given the 
thesis a context-specific understanding of the Electricity Market Reform from the perspective 
of (METI) that could not otherwise have been obtained.
the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has been the main institution in charge of formulation of the 
amendment to the Companies Act. Persons interviewed from the MoJ were of a lower rank 
than other respondents. Possibly this was an advantage as the respondents were more forth-
coming with information than the METI interviewees. While both respondents had worked 
for a shorter time on the reform compared to METI staff, prior to their employment at the 
ministry they had worked at high-end law firms. This made them qualified to comment on 
the Companies Act in a wider context. The MoJ was contacted after October 2013 to follow 
up on outcomes. The interviews, both in person and via email, have been indispensable for 
the empirical data set. The interview was conducted in English and respondents’ names are 
withheld for the reasons stated above.
frenk Withoos, as an expert of the Japanese electricity market, was interviewed to add an 
external perspective to the Electricity Market Reform and to explain how foreign pressure 
has been applied. He is Vice President of ABB Japan and Chairman of the European Business 
Council’s Energy Committee since 2009. ABB is a global leader in power and automation tech-
nologies and is represented in more than 100 countries. Withoos’s comments do not neces-
sarily reflect those of the European Business Council and ABB. His in-depth knowledge of the 
Japanese and European electricity market and understanding of the political environment of 
Japan have added value to the thesis’ chapter 4.26
yutaka Kitamura was interviewed to add a legal assessment and external perspective to the 
amendment to the Companies Act. He has been Managing Partner at the financial-services 
firm Ernst and Young, Japan since July 2013 and a part-time lecturer at Kyoto University Law 
School since 2010. Due to his background as well as his understanding of the Japanese and 
American legal system, Mr Kitamura should be viewed as an expert. His views and statements 
do not necessarily reflect those of Ernst and Young or any other institution he is affiliated to. 
His experience and knowledge of the field have added value to the thesis’ analysis presented 
in chapter 5. The interview was conducted in English.27
Bjorn Kongstad is currently Policy Director at the European Business Council in Japan, where 
he has worked since 2008. Kongstad has naturally followed the changes in regulatory reforms 
and is well informed here, especially in matters of interest for European businesses, e.g. 
Abenomics. He is also familiar with the formal and informal decision-making bodies in Japan. 
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Kongstad was interviewed to add an external perspective to Abenomics, FTAs, corporate gov-
ernance and the Electricity Market Reform. Despite coming with a European perspective, he 
has given a context-specific insight and added value to the thesis’ analysis chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
Kongstad’s statements and views do not necessarily reflect those of the EBC.
All interviews, apart from that with the TSE and Mark Manger, were conducted in Tokyo. In-
terviews with the Keidanren, METI, FEPC, Bjorn Kongstad, Frenk Withood and Yutaka Kitamura 
were obtained through formal introduction in a professional setting during my seven-month 
stay in Tokyo in 2013. The MoJ was contacted via a formal introduction to an unrelated office 
at the Ministry, from which I was passed on to both respondents.
The interviews and quotations from them have been used either in reference with each 
other or other sources of empirical data, such as official government documents, articles, aca-
demic papers or lectures. Their validity, though high, cannot stand alone when producing sig-
nificant conclusions but they have added context to already established information. However, 
it is not only empirical data from interviews that should be scrutinised; any source, regardless 
of its origin, should never stand alone in its claims or lead to one conclusion; it should always 
be triangulated. Due to the timely nature of the subject matter, interviews were necessary to 
fill the gaps in knowledge within the subject matter. However, one person’s conclusions will 
always run the risk of creating false results; thus context and triangulation of these comments 
enabled the analysis to produce nuanced, timely, relevant and valid conclusions.
In sum the interviews have allowed the analysis to gain insights into the decision-making 
process and industry–state relationships that otherwise might not have been apparent. Inter-
views were conducted with relevant persons from industry, state and external experts who 
contributed to an external assessment of the subject matter that more clearly reflects the 
relationship between industry and state in such reform formulations. Validity generated in 
qualitative interviews is both represented in the degree of transparency in the interview de-
sign and the selection of participants as well as the issue of subjectivity and interpretation.28
The issues of validity in these specific interviews have been related to language whilst 
more general issues of qualitative studies should also be noted. Issues of subjective selection 
effecting results as well as the limited possibility of conclusions being replicated or tested are 
especially connected to such types of data. Respondents were selected individually for their 
knowledge, expertise and in some cases also for the institution they represent. The selection 
process was affected by two variables: access and knowledge. Access to the correct individual 
was bound by formal introduction; if no introduction is given interviews are often hard to 
obtain in Japan. Access also came with knowledge of the field of study. As such, in-depth 
preparation for these interviews was necessary to give an understanding of the key areas 
of interest within the research question’s subject matter. As typical in qualitative research 
methods, knowledge was gained by drawing on different data sources and at the same time 
continually tightening the research question’s subject matter with further collection of data. 
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To this end, knowledge was gained before, during and after these interviews, which in turn led 
to additional interviews with both new and previous respondents, again leading to further in-
vestigation. As such, knowledge generation out of these interviews can be seen as the product 
of an analytical process that minimises subjectivity.29 The process can be seen below:
As mentioned above, validity is also generated in qualitative interviews through the trans-
parency of the interview design, selection of participants and post-interview analytical process. 
Interviews have as such been transcribed and coded into specific subgroups. These subgroups 
are found in Appendix 1 and are purely related to the subject matter’s theoretical framework 
as outlined in the coming section.
In addition, specific issues of validity connected to the interview conditions presented 
themselves. As noted, language was a significant challenge when conducting interviews and 
collecting empirical data. Interviews with METI and the FEPC were conducted through consec-
utive interpretation. While interviews held with the Keidanren, Ernst and Young and the MoJ 
were conducted in English, different cultural customs may have been at play here because the 
interviews presented a significant challenge in terms of the production of meaning. In other 
words, how can we be certain that the empirical data collected through interviews is correct? 
Apart from consecutive interpretation being utilised during the interviews, transcripts of these 
interviews were crossed-checked twice by an external translator. Corrections can be found in 
Appendix 4. In addition, translated members lists were also cross-checked. This procedure 
was adopted to limit mistranslation and thus heighten the level of validity and reliability. In 
addition cultural barriers were assumed to be present during interviews. This will always be a 
variable when studying Japan, whether it is in the form of interviews or published documents 
from Japanese authorities. Lessons learnt during my periods in Japan, both in 2012 and 2013, 
enabled me to be aware of some of these cultural variables. These lessons were reinforced by 
the interview with Mark Manger.
In sum the thesis has adopted a layered process of data collection and sought to limit 
initial subjectivity by using multiple sources. While not infallible, the process limits subjec-
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tive variables and demonstrates transparency of method and perception on which the thesis’ 
conclusions are founded. 
theory: the forceS of StructurAl reforM
The theoretical framework is the last element in this thesis’ analysis strategy and will help 
clarify the linkages between data, method and perception as presented above. Notably this 
thesis has adopted an inductive exploratory study and thus it follows that it will guide and not 
confine the empirical data in the coming analysis. The theoretical framework should as such be 
viewed as an analytical tool that guides the structure and interpretation of the analysis, whilst 
being able to expand and adapt to the empirical context.30
In the above perception section, a review was made of the literature on which actors effect 
regulatory reform outcomes. Given its inductive and exploratory approach, perception and 
specific focus on Japanese regulatory reforms, this thesis is very similar in its subject matter to 
Steven Vogel’s study.* In contrast to other literature presented previously, Vogel’s study is both 
specific to Japan and empirically founded. Hence, the framework of this thesis departs from 
Vogel’s theoretical approach to the subject of regulatory reforms in Japan. Notably the thesis’ 
perception, structure and method are inspired by Vogel’s works. His open-ended, political-
economy approach to regulatory reform to Japan enables his framework to be valuable, spe-
cific and appropriate for this thesis’ analysis. 
the focus on state and industry relationships is essential. The study of structural reform illumi-
nates the larger relationship between government and industry in Japan. As aforementioned, 
these relationships represent themselves as an essential mechanism when understanding 
public control over private sector behaviour through reform. By studying structural reforms, 
we can explain how state institutions shape policy choices and in turn what constraints the 
state when seeking to pass significant structural reform through the third arrow of Abenomics. 
As Vogel has clarified: Japanese government officials … are tied into tight networks of close-
working relationships with industry.31
Actor behaviour. Firstly we turn to the industry. Presumably all else being equal, competitive 
companies should favour reforms that e.g. promote foreign direct investment as it would be to 
their profit. Hence, the promotion of a strong corporate governance regime would be in these 
actors’ interest. However, in the specific context of Japan, all else is not equal. As Vogel has 
highlighted, we cannot know if the lack of support for such reforms is connected to the indus-
tries’ actual preferences or long-term relationships with their workers, government or other 
actors within the subject matter. In short, there are different rationalities present in Japan that 
go beyond the classical cost-benefit analysis. Even so, the lack of rational behaviour at present 
* Steven K. Vogel, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, has written several 
extensive works on Japanese politics, industrial policy and trade (more details: Berkeley 1). His study of this 
subject, however, is much wider than the scope of this thesis.
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can be accounted for through an historical contextualisation of such relationships. Behaviour 
contradicting rationality should as such not be viewed as random behaviour, merely a different 
perspective of benefit anchored in its historical context. Notably the behaviour of the different 
actors should be considered rational in seeking out the best outcomes. However, it is neces-
sary to view behaviour in the context of the historical structures that form relationships and 
current preferences. The importance of investigating the structural conditions historically is 
fundamentally to ensure one understands idea formation in the present.32
decision-making. The organisation of decision-making is closely linked to the formation of 
preferences. However, the method of decision-making constrains choices by structuring the 
incorporation of interest groups, defining state capabilities and societal interest. By focussing 
on the MoJ or METI’s ability to formulate reform, it also becomes clearer how interest groups 
apply pressure on the state and in turn how it reacts. The ideas or content of regulatory reform 
influence how officials from METI or the MoJ interpret market trends, adopt lessons from 
abroad and determine how new reforms should be put into practice. In turn these ideas will 
naturally affect the trends in the self-same marketplace. One can therefore view the process of 
decision-making as a feedback loop between state and external actors’ reactions and forma-
tions of alliances. The orientation of regulatory reforms constrains policy choices by defining 
what are acceptable or possible outcomes. In turn these shape state actors’ reaction to exter-
nal actors’ preferences and receptiveness to new ideas. The analysis therefore both recognises 
the different feedback loops that may occur in the process of decision-making as well as exter-
nal actors playing a crucial role. It will thus not only focus on the industry stakeholders but also 
on possible newcomers, foreign companies or consumer opinion to uncover if external forces 
for change effect state decision-making.33 
the focus on state must recognise its duality. To understand the state, we must first recognise 
that states are both actors and structures. It thus follows we should examine both the ideas of 
the state as actor and the capabilities it has as an institution. Hence the ideas and institutions 
of government policy towards industry are the focal point in this analysis. A study will be made 
of the institutions’ capabilities and actors’ ideas of the reform’s scope, method of decision-
making and goals when formulating the electricity market reform and the amendment to the 
Companies Act. In contrast to Vogel’s approach, this analysis will quite concretely focus on the 
frame of the decision-making and thus view the state as a totality. As mentioned earlier, the 
thesis notes that differences may exist between political parties and ministries. However, the 
analysis will understand the state through the relevant ministry’s involvement, ideas, scope 
and method in the respective reforms.34 As Vogel notes: we must begin with the bureaucrats 
who oversee these policies and whose ideology informs the substance of these policies. If we 
want to understand the policies shaping those reforms with the greatest potential to alter 
Japan’s economic model then we must look to the industry preferences about the substance 
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of these reforms and how these preferences are aggregated by industry associations, political 
parties and government ministries.35
the forces propelling reform change. Departing from the state/bureaucracy as ideas and in-
stitution, it is possible to fill the gaps between goals and method leading to reform change. 
As noted, policy goals reflect regime orientation (ideas) and capabilities reflect regime or-
ganisation (institutions) where ideas and institution are closely linked. Vogel highlights that 
institutions and ideas are fundamentally interlinked. Hence, institutional change is unlikely to 
gain a foothold in the absence of an associated policy direction. To examine these linkages we 
must first review the forces leading to such policy change. An historical analysis will examine 
both prior legislation and the area to be affected by the reform. In so doing the analysis will 
highlight evolutionary forces that have compelled the Japanese government to initiate such 
reforms and offer an understanding of the historically forged relationships between the actors. 
It will thus be able to identify the forces impacting on decision-making and hence the condi-
tions in which the state operates when implementing such reform.36
From the assumptions of the theoretical framework, the analysis will be able to cast some light 
on the state’s ability to formulate structural reforms. These assumptions are: 
• Actors’ preferences are bound to historic rationality of benefits not necessarily related to 
cost.
• A study of state/industry relationships can identify preferences.
• A study of external changing structures and actors can identify preferences.
• The bureaucrats are the departing point in understanding the state’s decision-making abil-
ity. 
• The scope, method and goals of reform are a product of both ideas and institutions of the 
state formed in the past. 
concluSion
This chapter has outlined, discussed and argued how the following analysis will proceed in the 
context of the thesis’ research question, perception, method and theory.  Notably the theo-
retical concepts presented above will enable the coming analysis to connect the dots between 
data, method and perceptions of the subject matter. 
Given the foregoing, the coming case analysis will use the following analytical framework. 
First, it will focus on the historic forces pushing for change including the relationship between 
industry and state, market conditions and legislative development. Second, it will focus on 
the decision-making structure of the reform and its areas of conflict. Third, it will focus on 
the goals and ideas of the state when pursuing reform. Fourth, it will focus on the goals and 
ideas of the industry and other external actors when supporting or opposing such reforms. 
Lastly, it will conclude the chapter by assessing the state’s ability to pass structural reform. 
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The analytical framework will thus be led by the theoretical framework, made coherent with 
the perception and inclusive of empirical results. The analytical framework will be revised in 
chapter 6, to reflect upon its capabilities.  
Following on from this approach, the coming chapter shall present the historical back-
ground to Abenomics, an outline of the reform and reactions to it.
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Abenomics and the quest for economic growth
“Three arrows cannot be broken” – Japanese proverb
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in December 2012 the LDP led by Shinzo Abe returned to power in 
Lower House elections to the National Diet. This was followed by a victory in the Upper House 
seven months later. Since coming to power the Abe government has pursued an economic 
strategy now dubbed Abenomics. Although this strategy is often perceived as a new policy, it 
has roots reaching back to the previous Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government’s agenda. 
Even earlier, attempts were made to implement structural reforms but with mixed results.
Given the importance of this historical context, this brief chapter will review the long-term 
background and outline the events leading up to the launching of Abenomics in late 2012. 
First, it will look at the historical development of the economic environment in Japan to il-
luminate fundamental characteristics of the market as well as how the state has reacted to it 
over the years.  Second, it will outline the goals and scope of the new reforms to explain how 
the position of the state has changed in relation to these historical developments and market 
conditions. Lastly, it will describe what the initial responses have been to Abenomics and what 
pressure the Abe administration has faced when pursuing its reform strategy.
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econoMic environMent And the BurSting of the BuBBle
Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan entered a period of rapid industrialization and 
high economic growth but its economy had been significantly crippled by the end of World 
War II. The post-war years saw a massive economic reconstruction and by the 1970s Japan had 
caught up with other industrial countries. In the later 1980s, the Japanese economy was charac-
terised by high growth and very low inflation levels, a situation that affected exports negatively. 
The situation also boosted asset prices and fuelled a rapid expansion in credit, initially causing 
price competition between banks. The latter in turn put a downward pressure on risk-adjusted 
interest-rate margins and motivated banks approve riskier loans. In particular, they expanded 
their consumer and real estate lending base as well as increased loan approvals toward SMEs.1
The highly overvalued stock market peaked in 1989, which in turn lead to an increase of 
the Bank of Japan’s discount rate. In the summer of 1990, the economic bubble burst* Sub-
sequently, economic growth slowed (Figure 3), this accompanied by a radical decline in real 
estate and stock prices.
In the aftermath of the burst bubble, the following domino effect occurred: (i) The prices 
of property holdings by real estate companies dropped to half their former value, hence the 
quality of loans approved for the sector quickly collapsed. (ii) Prior to 1991 borrowers could use 
* Further information on the subject is available. One interesting presentation was given by Yoshiyuki Iwamoto 
in his 2006 book: Japan on the upswing, why the bubble burst and Japan’s economic renewal.
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up to 90% of their real estate value as collateral. A 50% collapse in real estate prices between 
1994 and 1998 meant that 40% of all such loans became uncovered. (iii) The value of banks’ 
equity holdings thus rapidly declined, causing pressure on bank capital. (iv) Consequently, the 
general deceleration in economic growth (Figure 4) meant that many debtors were unable to 
maintain their loans.2
In the post-bubble economic environment, banks adjusted their credit-approval proce-
dures and guidelines for new loans, becoming less willing to approve loans. As a reaction to 
the economic crisis in the mid-1990s the Japanese government introduced a series of reforms 
dubbed the Big-Bang financial reforms. These reforms were announced in November 1996 
under the slogan free, fair and global aiming at drastically reforming the financial and capital 
markets. The big-bang reforms did stimulate growth but not to original levels of the 1970s and 
80s. The IMF additionally noted that the big-bang reforms accelerated deregulation whilst 
neglecting to adjust the regulatory framework appropriately. Here, the IMF has pointed to two 
variables that have unnecessarily prolonged the financial distress after the economic bubble: 
weak corporate governance and regulatory forbearance.3 However, the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997 also contributed to Japan entering into the 21st century with continued economic 
stagnation.4
The Asian financial crisis and the later 2008 global financial crisis both affected the Japa-
nese economy significantly, as seen above. Japan has recovered from both crises but growth 
has remained stagnant at around 2%. The post-bubble years, dubbed the lost decade, were 
characterised by continued deflation, thus creating low demand. Over the past two decades, 
the state’s attempts to dig Japan out of this economic stagnation has merely resulted in in-
creased government debt, now the largest among OECD countries.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, deregulation as implemented in the Big Bang reforms 
was no longer viewed as a solution for the economic and social problems mentioned above. 
Bruce E. Aronson lays out the new direction that Japan was being pointed towards including: 
tax measures, such as an increase in consumption tax rates and a decrease in corporate tax 
rates, reform of the social security system, and new free trade agreements...5
ABenoMicS And the three ArroWS
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the DPJ came to power in 2009 seeking to revive 
Japan’s economy and investment environment. Apart from passing a controversial increase 
in the consumption tax, the DPJ government was unable to implement significant reforms to 
revive the economy during its three years in office*.6
When the LDP returned to power in December 2012, the newly appointed Prime Minister 
entered into government with a plan to promote new economic policies, dubbed Abenom-
* There are several reasons why the DPJ government failed to implement such reforms. Certainly, the short 
lifespan of the government (from August 2009 to December 2012) was a factor. Also important were a lack of 
full support from the BoJ and the impact of the triple disaster of March 2011.
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ics. Within a week of becoming Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe announced increased government 
spending together with a Bank of Japan (BoJ) plan for increased financial stimulus. In April these 
initiatives were implemented as the first arrow of the government’s new monetary expansion 
policy. In addition, Abe replaced the head of the BoJ with Haruhiko Kuroda, whose views were 
in line with his own.* The newly appointed BoJ governor initiated quantitative easing, which 
lowered interest rates and helped the government keep to its 2% inflation target. Simultane-
ously, the second arrow was fired, implementing a fiscal stimulus package amounting to JPY 
20.2 trillion of which JPY 10.3 trillion would come from government spending, focusing espe-
cially on infrastructure projects. While keeping the fiscal stimulus policy unchanged, on the 
18 February 2014, the BoJ announced a doubling of the incentive programs to increase bank 
lending and thus weaken the yen which in turn increased stock market prices 3%. The first and 
the second arrow received positive feedback from investors and the stock market in 2013; a 
40% increase in stock market prices over 2012 was seen as well as a 20% depreciation in the 
yen against the US dollar, the lowest rate in five years. Depreciation in turn boosted exports 
and the economy grew in the first quarter of 2013 by 4.1%.7 Consequently the IMF adjusted 
its forecast for Japan, writing: The stronger forecast for 2013 than previously projected reflects 
the effects of recent accommodative policies on confidence and private demand.8
The third arrow was presented on 5 June 2013. The 94-page report, entitled Japan is Back, 
set out four overall themes within the structural reform:
1. Strengthening utilisation of human resources by promoting women, youth and the elderly 
in the workforce.
2. Promotion of investment to strengthen the private sector through regulatory and institu-
tional reform.
3. Creation of new markets, especially in the area of the life sciences.
4. Global economic integration, specifically the promotion of FTA negotiations with the EU 
and the wider TPP.9
The presentation received less than lukewarm reviews. It should be noted, however, that 
the third arrow was presented only weeks before the Upper House elections and the govern-
ment was assumedly constrained by public opinion and industry interests.10 The third arrow is 
necessary, Bjorn Kongstad from the EBC elaborates: The first and the second arrow [are] short 
term. ... It is easy to spend more money, but that only takes you so far. ... Japan can’t continue 
to just spend money and talk down the yen or talk up the Nikkei. ... You need to come up 
with something new and that is why we need the third arrow. That is why we need structural 
reform, in order to keep [the economy] sustainable.11
* Apart from being an experienced economist and former president of the Asian Development Bank, Haruhiko 
Kuroda also agreed with PM Abe’s economic policies.
Three arrows cannoT be broken!
24
In October 2013 the Diet began deliberating the third arrow in a number of policy areas 
and the outcome of such discussions are still uncertain. The third arrow is a wide-ranging 
reform, with some new initiatives whilst other aspects are old DPJ initiatives adopted by the 
LDP and integrated into its reforms. The government also, significantly, adopted the strategy 
of seeking FTAs with significant trade partners, which was first initiated by the DPJ government 
in November 2010. Since the late 90s Japanese industry has been one of the main advocates 
for launching FTA negotiations, especially with Mexico. However, the agricultural sector led by 
the Japan Agricultural Cooperatives group (JA) has consistently opposed these FTAs, includ-
ing the current TPP negotiations,* but the powerful industry organisation, the Keidanren, has 
pushed for FTAs and especially the TTP for some time. Hence in January 2013 its chairman, 
Hiromasa Yonekura, stated: Japan must join the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations no later 
than May.12 Abe is possibly stuck between a rock and a hard place in trying to satisfy both the 
agricultural sector and Keidanren, both of whom have traditionally supported the LDP.13
Nonetheless, as part of the third-arrow growth strategy, Japan joined the TPP negotiations 
in March 2013 and launched EU–Japan free-trade negotiations in the same month. At the 
time, Abe stated that the TTP agreement is Japan’s last chance to retain its position as a lead-
ing economic power, adding: I will protect what we must protect and demand what we must 
demand.14 
The question of what will be protected and how Abe intends to balance the wishes of 
industry, the public and his own party when pushing for change remains to be seen. In Decem-
ber new deadlines were announced: an action plan for the growth strategy and an established 
direction for new reforms, both to be concluded in the second half of 2014.15
Hope has indeed been injected into the Japanese economy and society at large. Despite 
much criticism, the Japanese stock market closed in 2013 with an annual gain of 57%, its 
best annual performance since 1972. On the other hand, the growth rate for the last quarter 
of 2013 merely increased 0.3% due to negative trade balances accompanied by a sluggish 
stock market increase in the first month of 2014. However, consumer and investor spending 
grew faster than seen in the third quarter of 2013 and stock market prices must be seen as in 
continued flux.16
At the same time, the Keidanren announced it would encourage its business members to 
increase wages in 2014. Labour unions are thus more likely to push for higher wages in their 
2014 negotiations, the prospect being rises in average wages across the country and hence 
increased spending and inflation. Already in annual wage negotiations starting on 7 February 
the changed attitude was visible. A trade union put demands to Japan’s largest steelmaker, 
Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corp., to increase its wages due to the profits generated by 
the Abenomics stimulus package. If agreed to, this will be the first hike of basic wages in 14 
years, and indicate that Abenomics indeed might be affecting actor behaviour. Further devel-
opments will be clear when the May 2014 wage negotiations are concluded.17
* For more information on Japan’s FTAs, see: MOFA1
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The Japanese government’s goals for economic growth are connected to the idea of 
opening up the country. It thus seeks to implement fundamental domestic reforms in order 
to strengthen the competitiveness it will need for economic partnerships of this kind [to be 
concluded]. As such the growth strategy is a two-edged sword because fundamental to the 
implementation of change is the state’s ability to pass such regulatory reforms. As the Harvard 
Political Review also has noted, Mr. Abe has the opportunity to be known as the man that 
brought Japan back from the economic ashes. It would be a pity if he threw it away with 
incomplete reforms.18
concluSion
Governments have been changing regulatory reforms ever since they began making them. The 
post-bubble economy has seen a banking crisis, flat economic growth and poor stock market 
performance, deflationary pressures, mounting debts from government fiscal stimulus pack-
ages and external economic shocks both in 1997 and 2008. Japan has ever since been trying to 
dig itself out of this economic mire. PM Abe’s efforts have created significant optimism both 
at home and in foreign markets. At the time of writing (February 2014), Abenomics was first 
initiated little more than a year ago with its first two stages of reform only being implemented 
during the first half of 2013. The third stage of reforms was first presented by Abe in June 
2013; it is still unclear how this third stage of structural reforms will crystallise. Although the 
press and academics have loudly criticised these structural reforms for being too vague and 
incomplete, deliberations are still underway among parliamentarians, bureaucrats, etc. As 
the Japanese Cabinet stated in December 2013, radical structural reforms are underway in a 
number of sectors. The actual outcome of the reform is still highly uncertain. While the world 
may be waiting for PM Abe to, as The Economist put it, get back into that telephone booth and 
change clothes,19 this study will look at two reforms that are part of the third-arrow’s growth 
strategy and have already reached the Japanese Diet.20
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The New Electricity Market Reform
If you are unable to understand the cause of a problem it is impossible to solve it.  
– Former Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan
On 13 November 2013 the Japanese Diet passed into law the first stage of the most ambitious 
reform of the country’s electricity market since 1951. The reform intends to ameliorate the 
high electricity prices and Japan’s worsened energy security situation that were a consequence 
of the 2011 triple disaster.1
This reform process illuminates the decision-making ability of the Japanese state to push 
through reform. As such, this chapter investigates the conditions in which the state must oper-
ate when pursuing regulatory reform. To understand why this reform was first initiated, it will 
first look at the historical development of the energy market and its conditions, both to illumi-
nate fundamental characteristics of the market as well as the forces acting upon it.  Second, 
it will outline the goals, scope and method of the reform to explain the position of the state 
in relation to these historical developments and market conditions. Third, it will explore the 
reactions of industry (insiders and outsiders) as well as consumers to the state’s goals, scope 
and method. The focus here will not only be on the industry’s interests but also on how it seeks 
to influence the policy output. Lastly, to evaluate what pressure is placed upon the state in 
pursuing regulatory reform, this chapter will compare the reactions of different players to the 
state’s agenda for changes in the electricity market.
the electricity MArKet Prior to 2011
Since the beginning of Japan’s industrialisation in the late 19th century, the country has de-
pended on a large and growing energy supply. The consumption of fossil fuels has thus in-
creased concurrently with the country’s economic growth. Japan is thus one of the largest 
consumers of energy in the world and has the second largest electricity market in the OECD.2 
With few natural energy resources and being geographically isolated as an island nation, Japan 
has been forced to find alternative means of satisfying its energy demands. Thus, Japan is 
to date the world’s third largest oil importer, second largest importer of coal and the largest 
importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG).3
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In 1951 Japan’s electricity market was established in its current form. Since then it has 
comprised ten regional private power companies that individually have monopolies on power 
generation, transmission and distribution in their respective regions. This regional system was 
designed to cope with Japan’s growing energy needs in the decades of economic expansion 
after World War II.4 
In 1973 Japan’s energy dependency peaked at 88.6% of its total supply, which made the 
country significantly vulnerable during the 1970s oil crisis. Following the crisis, in an effort to 
reduce its energy dependency, the Japanese government increased the use of nuclear power. As 
a result, Japan’s oil dependency dropped significantly, from 29% in 1990 to a mere 8% in 2010. 
Due to the rising utilisation of nuclear power, the country experienced a more healthy energy 
mix with coal, LNG and nuclear accounting for roughly 30% each. However, as can be seen in 
Figure 5, the role of renewable energy remained fairly low, about 10% of electricity generation. 
As a result of its nuclear strategy, the country had a very high energy density reaching 286 GW 
and as such had the third largest energy capacity in the world prior to March 2011.5
By 2010 the country’s energy dependency had been significantly reduced though this still 
amounted to around 60%. Energy prices in the 2000s were thus still relatively high compared 
to international levels. This was particularly significant for industrial consumers who faced the 
second highest electricity prices in the OECD. Among other reasons, the OECD has pointed to 
low competiveness in the energy sector effecting electricity prices negatively.6  
This low competitiveness can be traced back to the establishment of the ten vertically 
integrated energy utilities in 1951. These utilities acted as monopolies in their respective re-
gions, owning three-quarters of the generation capacity as well as the different transmission 
and distribution networks. Collectively the ten regional monopolies supplied 88% of the total 
consumption prior to 1995, only supplemented marginally by wholesale electrical utilities.7 
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In the aftermath of the economic bubble bursting in 1990 the Japanese government sought 
to liberalise the electricity market. In 1995 Japan thus partially liberalised the electricity mar-
ket as well as a number of other sectors in an attempt to overcome the economic stagnation. 
However, due to political pressure from the main utilities, the reform only partially liberalised 
the electricity market. The reform’s overall goal was to reduce electricity prices through in-
creased competition. The reform allowed wholesale suppliers to generate power and deliver 
electricity to the utilities. Moreover, the main utilities were now also permitted to procure 
electricity from each other; this had not been possible earlier. Both changes expanded the 
electricity wholesale market and opened the door to newcomers.8 
However, the ten utility companies remained solely responsible for their respective re-
gions. Even though it was now permitted for utilities to procure electricity from each other, 
this was logistically difficult as electricity output only can be maintained at a fixed frequency. 
The western regions – Chugoku, Kansai, Hokuriku, Kyushu, Shikoku and Chubu – were (and 
still are) run on a 60Hz frequency for electric current whereas the eastern regions of Hok-
kaido, Tohoku and Tokyo are run on a 50Hz frequency (see map below). Hence, even though 
the Japanese energy grid is highly efficient, transfers of electricity between the eastern and 
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western regions and even among 50Hz regions has been highly problematic. According to 
Vice President of ABB Japan Frenk Withoos, Japan attempted to resolve the issue of different 
frequencies prior to 2011 through the development of a HVDC electric power transmission 
system. The HVDC system can be considered high-end technology. On the other hand, with a 
size of 1 GW compared to the country’s total generation capacity of over 200GW, it can only 
be seen as a pet project rather than a serious attempt to resolve the regions’ incompatible 
frequencies. At the time there was no interest to integrate the grid further than this. Rather, 
the focus of the individual utilities was on their own generation possibilities, their ability to 
strengthen their regional grids and on serving their industry in their region alone.9
As seen above, energy transfers between most regions are limited, especially between 
eastern and western Japan. This, in part, has also been an issue for liberalising the market by 
increasing the level of competition among regions. However, as mentioned, before 2011 this 
was not seen as a huge issue. The ten different utility companies were organised as individual 
‘islands’ benefiting from a fixed cost-plus structure as well as facing only partial liberalisation 
of the retail competition from 2000.* Due to the structure of the electricity market, then, the 
utility companies had no motivation to buy electricity from each other because, as Frenk With-
oos states, they [the ten utility companies] had the generation capacity and they can increase 
the generation capacity because they can charge the cost plus the margin to the customer.10
While no actual law has enshrined the regional monopolies of these ten energy utilities, no 
new general utility company has been founded since 1951, with the exception of one on Oki-
nawa. The 10 large utility companies, or Electric Power Companies (EPCOs), thus completely 
dominate Japan’s electricity market with a mere 3.6% of capacity sourced from non-EPCO 
power suppliers and producers to date.11
Thus, to a large degree, the structure of the electricity market has been shaped by the activi-
ties and developments of these ten EPCOs. In the period of economic boom in the 1980s, the 
companies contributed greatly to overseas projects and technological advancements. Having 
preferential market advantages, to a higher degree the EPCOs could build a solid infrastructure 
in their respective regions.12 As Withoos also concludes, they [the ten EPCOs] did not do a bad 
job; they really built a country, an infrastructure which was one of the top ones in the world 
… What they probably forget is that time is changing. Time has changed and also for them.13 
The issues of price and energy security remained of concern to the Japanese government. 
The 1995 reform thus became the first of a series of reforms to deal with both price and 
energy security differently than prior. 
electricity MArKet reforMS Prior to 2011
For the past 25 years the discussion of energy security has been the main driver of Japanese 
electricity policy aimed at securing the country’s economic growth and stability. In line with 
* A fixed cost-plus structure refers to utility companies being able to charge the customer based on their cost 
plus a fixed margin. For more information on electricity price structure, see TEPCO 2.
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this, the push for nuclear power has been part of government policy for the past three decades 
as have bans on new/replacement oil-fired power generators and funding for development, 
research and investment in alternative energy sources. As mentioned above, the energy mix 
has consisted less of oil, a shift that additionally complemented the government’s environ-
mental and climate goals, Japan being the first host country to conclude the world’s most 
ambitious climate agreement to date – the Kyoto Protocol.14 
The electricity sector is mainly regulated by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry – 
previously known as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry – pursuant to the Electric 
Utilities Industry Law. The law gives METI statutory authority to regulate the entry, exit and 
expansion of the electricity market, the coordination of utilities and the regulation of tariffs.* 
The law also stipulates the responsibility of each of the ten EPCOs to supply their region.15 
The Ministry embarked on a series of reforms after the bursting of the economic bubble in 
1990. As mentioned, the 1995 amendment to the utilities law became the first reform aiming 
to introduce competition in the Japanese electricity market. From 1995, independent generat-
ing businesses were therefore no longer required to acquire a permit. In addition, the ten 
EPCOs could now also buy electricity from each other. However, this change had less of an 
impact than planned due to the above-mentioned price structure and frequency issues. From 
implementation of the reform until 1997, 39 utility projects were won by independent outside 
generators. The reform’s introduction of partial liberalisation of retail supply in turn put slight 
pressure on generation costs. On the other hand, there was no pressure to reduce network 
costs nor even generation costs due to the regional monopolies and fixed-price structure en-
joyed by the utilities.16 
In 2000, the electricity retail supply was liberalised gradually for extra high-voltage us-
ers (those whose demand exceeded 2MW – i.e. large factories, offices and other corporate 
costumers). The change made it possible for newcomers in the electricity production business 
to supply these customers by using the electricity grid of the main utilities. In the aftermath 
of this second electricity reform, these newcomers were able to secure 2% of the liberalised 
market. Even though only minimal liberalisation was introduced in the first and second reform, 
costs did go down. Between 1996 and 2006 the main utilities decreased their rates by 15–20% 
as a consequence of the two reforms.17
In 2005, a third reform expanded the retail competition for medium-sized, high-voltage 
customers (those with usage over 50kW) and sought to encourage an increased level of power 
exchange on a nationwide scale by revising the cross-area wheeling service system. To this 
end, the Japan Electric Power Exchange (JPEX) and its supporting body for transmission in wider 
areas, the Electric Power System Council of Japan (ESCJ), were established. JPEX’s main goal was 
to facilitate wholesale power exchanges by forming index prices for long-term investment and 
* Permits for entering the market are only granted if it is determined that there is a demand for a given service 
and it will have no consequence for electricity consumers (OECD, 1999: 17)
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improving the means of sale and procurement. In 2008, however, additional plans to liberalise 
the electricity market were halted.18
It is hard to make claims to the state’s original intentions and to what extent the four 
reforms were watered down due to lobbying. However it is not uncommon for Japan’s neo-
liberal regulatory reforms to be bolder on paper than in practice; this might indicate a general 
tendency on the part of the state. With regard to lobbying, it is even harder to say how open 
the utility companies were to a liberalisation of the electricity market. The Federation of Elec-
tric Power Companies represents the ten utility companies’ interests.19 In an interview last 
year, FEPC representatives stated “we were okay with liberalisation. We were okay before the 
earthquake, and we are still okay with it; we think that it is where things are going anyway”.20 On the other hand, the halt in liberalisation in 2008 could signify that the industry might not have been as willing to go along with this liberalisation as they stated.
JAPAn’S energy Security At the croSSroAdS: the 2011 triPle diSASter
Japan took big steps after the oil crisis in the 1970s to secure its energy supply with the expan-
sion of nuclear power generation in the country. This strategy was effectively destroyed, how-
ever, on Friday, 11 March 2011 at 2:46pm when the Great East Japan Earthquake, measuring 
9 on the Richter scale, struck Japan and was followed by a massive, wide-reaching tsunami. 
Together the earthquake and tsunami constituted the largest natural disaster ever recorded 
in a developed country. 15,872 people died as an effect of the natural disaster stretching from 
Hokkaido in the north to Kanagawa in the south. Besides the huge death toll, 468,000 people 
had to evacuate their homes, 1.21 million homes and buildings were damaged or destroyed 
and total economic damages amounted to 16.9 trillion yen.
The devastating loss of human life and livelihood on 11 March was quickly overshadowed 
by another, potentially more deadly disaster that day. At 3:42pm, Tokyo Electric Power Co. 
(TEPCO) informed the government that the tsunami had struck its Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear 
power plant and crippled the plant’s backup power supply, resulting in a total blackout. Four 
out of the six reactors did not have access to power required to cool the nuclear fuel rods 
inside the units; the threat of a nuclear disaster was eminent. Prime Minister Kan declared 
a state of nuclear emergency at 7:03pm. At 3:36pm the next day a large hydrogen explosion 
occurred in unit No. 1. Concerns mounted that the second reactor also might blow and an 
evacuation of the plant was debated in the coming hours. The following day at 5:40am, PM 
Kan addressed TEPCO staff working in the main operations room. Kan stated that the govern-
ment would not allow a retreat from the Fukushima-Daiichi plant; 20 minutes later a hydrogen 
explosion occurred in reactor No. 4 and load crashing noises were heard from unit No. 2. The 
plant manager at the time, Yoshida, ordered around 650 workers to leave the facility despite 
PM Kan’s orders. Some 50 workers, the famous ‘Fukushima fifty’, remained to deal with nec-
essary work. Countries across the globe – from South Africa, United States and Germany to 
China, South Korea and Singapore – offered their assistance. The nuclear threat and radiation 
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become of increasing concern and on 12 April the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency under 
METI raised the severity of the Fukushima accident to 7, the highest level on the INES scale. 
Subsequently, several workers and members of the public have been treated for radiation 
poisoning and concerns about thyroid cancer have become a reality. It was first in December 
2011 that the new prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda,* officially declared that the Fukushima-
Daiichi plant was in a state of cool shutdown, i.e. temperatures were acceptable and radiation 
levels were within the government’s limits. To this day, the situation is still uncertain, with the 
recent radioactive water leakages etc.21 
The nuclear accident created such damage to the reactors of the Fukushima-Daiichi plant 
that none of the six units will ever run again. The devastating effect of the triple disaster was 
of a magnitude never before experienced in modern times by any nation state outside of 
wartime. As a result, several problems with the structure of Japan’s electricity market came 
to light:
• Issues of transmission between regions (different frequencies in electric current prevented 
the transfer of sufficient amounts of electricity from western Japan to earthquake-struck 
eastern Japan).
• Little or no competition as well as strong price control.
• Limitations in the energy mix prior to 3/11.22
These issues were highlighted in severe criticism of TEPCO’s ability to act in a crisis situ-
ation, of the collaboration between TEPCO and the government, and of the whole nuclear 
safety situation. People even demonstrated in front of TEPCO’s headquarters, something that 
is rather uncommon in Japan. The tight-knit community referred to as the nuclear village of 
vendors, utilities, bureaucrats and regulators (among others, from METI), which had worked 
and partied together prior to 3/11, now became highly criticized.23  
At first, people were angry with the utilities but subsequently they became angry with 
METI, as Withoos elaborates: So people got angry about METI. So I think they want to step 
away from this now and show that “no, we are not anymore this utility company, we are METI, 
we are a ministry and we will make our own policies!” 24
Following the disaster, the Japanese government was forced to rethink its approach to 
nuclear power and the general energy mix. In September 2012 the Nuclear Regulatory Author-
ity (NRA) was established as an independent body with the purpose of dealing with the new 
nuclear safety standards. As a result, nuclear power plants were shut down, one after the 
other. Indeed, by September 2013 all nuclear power plants had stopped running due to safety 
concerns from the NRA. The utilities have thus faced severe financial difficulties and TEPCO 
came close to bankruptcy before receiving one trillion yen from the government in exchange 
* PM Noda assumed office after PM Kan’s resignation in September 2011. Noda later lost his post to the current 
LDP PM, Shinzo Abe, in December 2012.
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for giving up corporate control.25 More serious for the nation as a whole was the loss of around 
30% of its energy supply, which in turn necessitated an increase in LNG imports.
In the period after the disaster the DPJ government thus began seeking to phase out 
nuclear power. Withoos elaborates: The previous government was of course a bit of a different 
animal, [politicians] who actually were faced with this crisis and who completely changed their 
opinion about nuclear power and what they wanted to do. They actually made a proposal to 
abandon the nuclear power, they actually made the plan.26 However, the Keidanren, as a busi-
ness organisation that had been a major pillar of the nuclear village prior to the 3/11 disaster, 
now went against public opinion and together with other business interest groups pushed to 
block the DPJ’s efforts to phase out nuclear energy altogether.27 In contrast to the previous DPJ 
government’s aim to phase out nuclear power completely, the current LDP administration has 
decided to reconsider this nuclear closure strategy and is allowing reactor restarts subject to 
NRA approval.28 
Clearly, the issues revealed by the 3/11 disaster are of major concern to Japan’s future. 
This is highlighted by Withoos: “I think time has passed them [Japan] by in terms of the utility, 
the infrastructure. I think time has passed them by in the business industry also but of course 
in utilities quite a bit. Unfortunately it took a big disaster to wake some people up.” As can be 
seen, the former DPJ government did respond and not only by looking to phase out nuclear 
power. In an effort to rethink Japan’s energy structure, the government established an expert 
committee to formulate Japan’s new electricity reform in February 2012. A year later the final 
recommendations were presented to the Cabinet of the new LDP government. This became 
the basis for the new electricity market reform. 
the neW electricity MArKet reforM
On 2 April 2013, the LDP Cabinet approved a three-stage reform of the country’s electricity 
market, the most comprehensive reform of this sector in Japan since 1951. This seeks to secure 
a stable supply of electricity, the lowering of electricity rates and expanding consumer choice. 
As seen earlier in this chapter, the issue of energy security has been of concern to Japan, 
especially since the 1970s oil crisis. Following the nuclear disaster in 2011, the government 
has sought to rethink the energy mix in an attempt to better secure electricity supplies. Now it 
seeks to change the structure of the electricity market by altering how demand and supply are 
controlled. To this end, demand will be controlled through consumer preference and the elec-
tricity exchange between the 10 different regions. This is in contrast to the current structure 
where any amount of power is supplied according to demand at the same rate.29
As mentioned the issue of high electricity rates has been a recurring issue even before 
2011. Apart from wishing to introduce the merit order,* the government again argues that to 
reduce rates it is necessary to increase competition and thus also increase investments. This is 
in line with the argumentation of previous reforms though the extent of earlier liberalisation 
*  The ranking of energy sources available in terms of energy which has the lowest cost being sold first. 
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was minimal. It is therefore interesting in the coming analysis to illuminate why such reform 
has been pushed now when the issue of price and the state’s method of reducing prices have 
not been altered.
Increased competition is also emphasised as central when seeking to expand the opportu-
nities of businesses and consumers. One respondent from METI elaborates: We have a vision 
of what we would like to see happen. First, we want companies with a strong competitive spirit 
to enter the newly liberalised energy market. During the 2011/03 disaster, it became clear 
that there could be huge problems of cost, and that power supply is not always guaranteed. 
As a result, with the new reform, we are hoping to find solutions to these problems as well as 
creating a dynamic energy market.30 
Thus, the government wishes to liberalise the choice of consumer suppliers, rate plans 
and energy sources as well as promote the entrance of newcomers from other industries and 
regions into the market. The reform seeks to implement full liberalisation and thus change the 
system completely.
Stage one
The first stage of the reform was passed in the National Diet in November 2013 and ap-
proved creation of an Organization for Cross-regional Coordination of Transmission Operators 
(OCCTO) as well as finalising the action plan for the second and third stage of reform. OCCTO 
will be established in 2015 as an independent private body monitored by the government. The 
organisation has three main functions. First, it will collect and analyse the ten utilities’ supply 
and demand plans as well as grid structure. Based on this information, OCCTO will inform on 
and develop the EPCOs’ supply plans and interconnection lines throughout Japan. This will in 
turn increase regulation of the EPCOs’ conduct. Second, it will coordinate the supply-demand 
balancing as well as the frequency adjustments by transmission/distribution sectors and thus 
promoting an integrated electricity system beyond the regions.31 Finally, it will be able to order 
the EPCOs to increase power generation and energy exchanges in times of emergency or tight 
supply-demand situations in general. OCCTO will therefore also be a coordinating body in times 
of emergency, something that was lacking during the 3/11 disaster.32 In sum, the organisation 
will work towards enforcing a nationwide, integrated electricity system, both in developing 
frequency converters as well as interconnection lines. 
As mentioned earlier, concerns were raised regarding the tight-knit community of METI of-
ficials and utility companies. With the implementation of the first stage of the reform, OCCTO 
will be an intermediary between the EPCOs and METI as seen below. On the other hand, METI 
stated in October 2013 that some OCCTO staff may be recruited from the utility companies 
themselves, as experts will be needed. This might bring the impartiality of the organisation 
into question.33
The design of OCCTO though remains to be finalised. This work will be undertaken by a 
working group tasked with the Design for OCCTO and TDSOs and regulatory authorities to-
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gether with four other agenda points. In August 2013 this working group was established. The 
group consists of eight members from academia and finance as well as seven experts selected 
from the industry. The FEPC is represented through four expert members from the main utility 
companies, together with two newcomers to the market and one wholesale company. FEPC 
elaborates: If there was to be a decision to rush the process and just to make the law pass very 
quickly, in urgency, then they [the government] probably would drop all the observers and all 
the experts and just keep the professors which are actual members. But I do not think that is 
going to happen. They [the expert members] definitely have influence. 
The implementation of the three-staged reform is thus very much influenced by the discus-
sions held in working groups. Although the LDP controls both houses, they have still wished to 
include various experts, also notably the utility companies. Withoos explains that, in contrast 
to other countries, Japanese governments, even when controlling both houses of the legisla-
ture, will seek to consult the different parties before concluding such significant reforms. In 
Japan you cannot come with: “this is my plan”. They really have to say “we have to reform this 
market and please give your input” and everybody will write something ... and they will come 
back and they will say, “okay this is what we are going to do”.34 
Stage two
The second stage of the reform seeks to increase competiveness in the electricity market by 
2016. A full liberalisation of the retail market will be implemented which in turn will allow 
newcomers to enter the power-generation market. In addition all consumers, including house-
holds, will freely be able to choose an electricity provider, rate plan and option depending 
on power source. Information will be provided on the different energy suppliers to promote 
free competition and consumer satisfaction. As mentioned the government still regards freer 
competition as the method to reduce energy prices. Although the second stage will thus abol-
ish tariff regulation, the ten utility companies will still be subject to such regulation until full 
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competition is implemented in 2018. Additional tariff regulation measures will remain in place 
after full liberalisation to protect consumers. Lastly, the second stage of the reform intends to 
strengthen JPEX and thus the wholesale market to increase the share of trading. 
METI is expecting that companies in Japan as well as foreign companies entering the mar-
ket will expand, and will thus contribute to economic growth.35 The reform would as such hurt 
the revenue of the already existing utilities. Even so, the FEPC has made it clear that they 
have never had an issue with liberalisation and seek through the working group to make the 
introduction of market liberalisation go as smoothly as possible. However, the third stage of 
reform has received less than lukewarm enthusiasm from the FEPC: What we are saying is 
that, when it is going to come to the third step, that needs to be taken seriously and looked up 
and investigated. And then we can think about maybe putting it in place.36
Stage three
The third stage of the reform is the last and most disputed agenda point and, similar to the 
European strategy, it intends to legally unbundle the transmission/distribution sectors by 
2018–20. In contrast to Europe, however, transmission and distribution will remain within the 
same company. In other words, the reform seeks to unbundle and separate the transmission/
distribution sector from the ten EPCOs but not separate the two sectors completely. This stage 
of the reform seeks to further secure the neutrality of the transmission/distribution sector. 
To this end, the last stage of the reform intends to break up the monopolies into separate 
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generation and transmission companies and, as mentioned, abolish price control. As such, the 
EPCOs will keep their regional monopolies in the transmission/distribution sector alone but 
with increased regulation from the OCCTO and METI (see Figure 8).37
Naturally, the ten EPCOs have uttered concerns regarding this phase. As one METI Deputy 
Director explained: So when it comes to unbundling, obviously they [the utilities] have to take 
their own companies apart. So they are not happy about that.38
As noted, the reform process has allowed the utility companies to be involved in policy 
recommendation through the working groups and thus to influence policy outcomes via this 
forum. In the following section, we will look closer into the relationship between the industries 
and government as well as other variables shaping the state’s decision-making.
the relAtionShiP BetWeen induStrieS And governMent
We have seen that prior to the 3/11 triple disaster, Japanese electricity market reforms have 
been more or less bold in rhetoric but minimal in substance. METI has heavily regulated entry 
into and operation of the electricity marketplace while having an intertwined relationship with 
the utility industry in the so-called ‘nuclear village’. The state has selectively introduced liber-
alisation slowly to increase competition without damaging the already existing utility struc-
ture. The current reform also promotes competition, but it breaks with the earlier approach of 
strategic regulation of competition. The reform thus represents a policy shift in which METI is 
distancing itself from utilities after 3/11 in the backdrop of heavy criticism of its involvement 
in the nuclear village. 
The ten utility companies in the nuclear village were and are represented by two interest 
organisations, the Keidanren and FEPC. The Keidanren has claimed that they represent the 
Japanese consumer in the matter of energy. In the above section, however, it was seen that 
the Keidanren was one of the major pillars of the nuclear village and went against public opin-
ion when lobbying for nuclear power post 3/11. Due to their historical ties with the industry, 
it is thus hard to consider them a neutral party pursuing consumer interests separate to those 
of the main utilities. Witthoos agrees: First and foremost, I don’t think the Keidanren represent 
the consumer industry; they clearly represent the industry. They have been part of this utility 
society very deeply for a long time. So I do think that they have a certain hidden interest in 
trying to keep everything as much as possible the same.39 
As mentioned, the third stage of the reform has been under close scrutiny both by the 
Keidanren and FEPC, with the Keidanren publishing a policy paper identifying five risk factors 
here (see Appendix 5). Primarily, the Keidanren has raised concerns about the reform’s ability 
to secure energy security and lower electricity prices.40  The FEPC has supported the general 
criticism expressed here. Concerns about such a complete change in the electricity market 
are understandable, as Withoos elaborates: If they [the EPCOs] are criticising or they believe 
that there is a risk, I think rightfully so. There is of course a risk, there is in anything, in any 
change you make, there is of course a risk that things will move in a [wrong] way. However, the 
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electricity situation which Japan is faced with is not sustainable and something must change 
in its present state.41
Both the Keidanren and the FEPC have seen a problem in legal unbundling of the market. 
They have pointed out that Japan’s electricity market is very different to those in the EU and 
US, arguing that just because unbundling has been done in Europe it does not mean that it can 
be done in Japan. As mentioned, the FEPC is on the working group and thus can directly affect 
policy output. The organisation stated in regard to the third stage that: We are not even sure 
you can get to the third step. There are ten companies and all of them have slightly different 
systems and even management styles. As an ensemble it is really hard to say how each of them 
are going to deal with it [the third stage], individually also.42 It thus seems clear that the utility 
lobby intends to hinder implementation of the third stage of the reform in its current form.
The institutional framework of decision-making in Japan (as described above) has allowed 
the main utilities to affect the state’s ideas and thus policy outcomes. Historically the elec-
tricity market has been bundled and changing this has raised concern. In both the Cabinet 
decision of 2 April 2013 and the subsequent government bill that was passed by the Diet in No-
vember 2013, the state expressed its belief that legal unbundling is superior compared to the 
functional unbundling in terms of stable supply and safety.43 However, comments in the Diet 
session of 20 June raised concerns about changing a structure that had long been in place and 
thus upsetting the stability of the electricity market. The Japanese Electricity Group chairman 
advocated further discussion on this stage of the reform.44 To this end the Cabinet and Diet 
decisions leave open the possibility of a reconsideration of both the timing of implementation 
and if unbundling should be on legal basis.45 In an interview in October 2013, METI officials 
expressed that they did not yet know what will happen. The intention to legally unbundle is 
on METI’s agenda but as a METI Deputy Director noted: Big electrical companies have a lot 
of political power. In the end we don’t really know.46 In other words, METI acknowledges that 
the utilities exercise a large influence. Even though they are financially crippled, in no way 
should their influence be disregarded. Indeed their lobbying power did come to light when 
they pushed for a more pro-nuclear strategy in the aftermath of 3/11. On the flip side, there 
are external forces in Japan moving in an utterly different direction that the utility lobby will 
find it hard to stop.47  
METI’s current position is that, by wishing to legally unbundle the market, they are stand-
ing in opposition to the utilities. Even so, what METI intends is not necessarily what will be 
implemented. Withoos and Kongstad both believe that the current reform proposal will be 
watered down; but the question is, to what extent? Withoos does not see the reforms be-
ing watered down to the extent that the Keidanren and FEPC are seeking. Their success in 
overturning the previous government’s stance on phasing out nuclear power could be merely 
related to Japan’s energy mix. Even though renewable energy was being promoted, one might 
question if it could have replaced the 30% nuclear power void. Legal unbundling in contrast is 
part of a coherent policy of increasing competition to secure energy supplies. This method is 
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thus consistent with previous reforms, though it emphasises competition to a larger extent. In 
contrast to prior reforms, two main circumstances differ. First, the current financial difficulties 
of the main utilities were spawned by the nuclear shutdown. Compared with the past, their 
resources to affect public opinion and policy have decreased. Arguably the situation would be 
very different if the utilities’ finances were in great shape, as there would be less reason to 
implement substantial change.48 Second, there have been changes in consumer and business 
behaviour since the 3/11 disaster, putting additional pressure on the government to imple-
ment change. This was something that the FEPC also acknowledged in an interview last year: 
Rather than actually foreign companies … it seems more like it is the Japanese industry that 
is pushing. The industry wanted to get into the electricity industry and so on. Like Softbank.49
outSide PreSSure on governMent
In the aftermath of the 3/11 disaster, Softbank, Japan’s third largest telecom company, created 
a subsidiary called SB Energy Corp. The subsidiary announced its plans to enter the electricity 
market with plans to build several renewable energy power plants in more than 10 locations 
(capacity reaching 200MW).  To this end, in July 2013, Softbank again announced plans to 
install a 200 kW system of its prime location in Fukuoka in a 50/50 joint venture with American 
Bloom Energy. Softbank has been very proactive in seeking such business opportunities given 
the prospects of a liberalised electricity market.50 This initiative by the company was one of the 
first instances after 3/11 of external pressure being exerted on the government by forces apart 
from METI and the utilities.
The 30% void post-3/11 created business opportunities for companies as Softbank. These 
businesses therefore naturally took an interest in the liberalisation of the electricity market, 
as was mentioned by the FEPC. Withoos also elaborates: So this relationship with all those 
people voicing opinion about utilities, about infrastructure, much more feasibility. I think that 
is why even the government cannot now still pretend not to do anything.51 Moreover, other 
companies in Japan that already have their own generation capacity, such as the pulp and 
paper industry, would also have incentives to enter the electricity market if the calculated 
benefits of selling energy outweighed those of using energy for production.52 
Aside from such new actors from Japanese industry taking an interest in the electricity 
market, foreign business interest organisations have attempted to influence the government’s 
decision-making. The EBC Energy Committee members have had several meetings with METI 
as well as academic members of the working group. Withoos adds that the European compa-
nies: did organise a number of visits for university professors to Europe to look at and talk to 
some of the utility companies, including the transmission as well as HVDC projects.53 To what 
degree these visits influenced METI it hard to say but, given that the third stage of the reform 
leans towards the European model, it would be hard to say that there has been no influence.
Apart from external industry players, the general public became more aware of the elec-
tricity sector. As mentioned, people became angry, they demonstrated and started demanding 
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an explanation from the government. People could feel the effects of losing 30% of the energy 
mix with electricity prices increasing. TEPCO became a scapegoat for many of the issues re-
lated to the nuclear disaster,* but the government still had to show change; the energy cost is 
going up, it is not sustainable, industries are struggling – one way or another, something has 
to give way, Withoos concluded.54
These external factors have not only put pressure on the government to push for change 
but have also affected the main utilities, too. Chubu Electric Power Co. Inc, one of the ten 
EPCOs, has shown signs of changed behaviour since 2013. After revenues had shrunk in the 
backdrop of the indefinite shutdown of its only nuclear power plant, the company bought 
80% of the Mitsubishi-owned Diamond Power Corp located in Tokyo. As such, by entering 
TEPCO’s regional territory, Chubu Electric will become the first utility company to sell power 
outside its own regional monopoly. In addition, in a joint venture with Mitsubishi and Nippon 
Paper Industries Co., the company will build a new coal-fired thermal power plant in Shizuoka 
Prefecture. This change in behaviour from Japan’s third-largest utilities company signifies a 
break from the traditional monopoly structure.55
When questioned about this changed behaviour, Chubu Deputy General stated: With all 
these things, there are going to be new businesses [entering the market] (and obviously not 
only Chubu), but it is probably going to be a lot more competitive when it comes to Tokyo.56
The structural alterations in the aftermath of the 3/11 earthquake have no doubt changed 
the behaviour of both Japanese industry and consumers. The government has coherently fol-
lowed its ideas to increase competition as a method to secure a healthy energy mix and reduce 
prices. The effect of new businesses wishing to enter the market seems likely to have more of 
an effect than public opinion. This observation is not only founded on the earlier disinclination 
of the government and policy-makers to follow public opinion in respect to nuclear power 
but also because it is likely that public opinion will change when prices are reduced signifi-
cantly. The public has shown increased interest in the electricity sector since the disaster but 
it has been METI and the industry that have pushed for change in a specific direction. With 
large companies such as Softbank entering the market and the poor financial situation of the 
utilities, the government has been forced to find new avenues than has occurred in the past. 
Moreover, while the consultation framework has included the main utility companies, giving 
them direct access to affect any reforms proposed, now newcomers and other segments of 
Japanese industry have also been included. METI remains in control of the process and has 
specific goals, though by including different actors in the process the Japanese industry will 
continue to shape the details of future reforms. Withoos captures the dilemma the govern-
ment is faced stating: The politicians in any case they come and go, so it is more the bureau-
* Following the 3/11 the Japanese government has used TEPCO as a useful scapegoat, despite it having taken 
control of the company, e.g. when they were blamed for the radioactive water leakages in 2013. For further 
insights see Colin P. A. Jones’ analysis in Fukushima and the right to responsible government
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crats that are in control of this. And I think they have a challenge to try to incorporate all these 
different comments they were getting and are getting [on the reform].57
concluSion
In this chapter we explored how the Japanese government was confined in its options when seek-
ing to formulate and pass the new electricity market reform. The government’s efforts to reform 
the electricity market have not been formulated in a vacuum. Forces separate to the policy for-
mulation have started to affect the structures that were in place prior to 3/11. As also illustrated, 
significant past changes to the electricity market have been introduced when the country was 
faced with a crisis. In the aftermath of World War II, the main utility companies were founded. 
The oil crisis in the 1970s pushed Japan towards for a more healthy and independent energy 
mix. The bursting of the economic bubble in 1990 paved the way for introducing competition. 
Yet again it seems that it took the triple disaster of March 2011 to bring change to the structure 
of the Japanese electricity market. It is important to note that it was not any change that could 
be introduced but reforms that very much build on previous reforms. The 3/11 disaster moved 
different players in the industry and the public to pressurize METI to push for change. The ideas 
and methods of the state did not change; they were merely enhanced when overwhelming criti-
cism led to METI’s validity being at stake. A weakened utility sector still managed to block policy 
that would have led to its own downfall. The question though still remains if they will be able to 
stop the third stage of electricity market reforms passing through the Diet. The direction of the 
different interests internally in Japan though must change for further liberalisation to be blocked. 
Even so, METI is still concerned if it is possible for the third stage of reform to pass, which is no 
doubt a natural reaction given the history of the Japanese electricity market.
Chapter 6 will revisit these observations and conclusions to better grasp how the Japa-
nese government is constrained in its options when pushing for regulatory reform. Meantime, 
using the same analytical approach, the next chapter will explore how the government was 
restricted when seeking to formulate and pass the amendment to the Companies Act.
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The amendment to the Companies Act
The puzzle is not to explain why there is no change in practice, because pre-
sumably they never wanted to change, but then the question becomes why 
there is change on paper at all? – Mark Manger
On 29 November 2013, Japan’s Ministry of Justice submitted the very first amendment to 
the Companies Act, aiming to improve corporate governance in the country. At first glance, 
this might seem a minor measure but in fact the action was taken after pressure from foreign 
investors. Moreover, its outcome signifies a crucial towards step improving the FDI situation in 
Japan, a key aim of the third arrow of Abenomics.
The head of the Tokyo Stock Exchange Advisory Committee, Professor Hideki Kanda, has 
defined corporate governance as: a system of supervision over corporate actions and decision-
making.1 As such, arguably corporate governance has been present in Japan for as long has 
corporations have existed. The main discussion with regard to Japan, however, has been if this 
supervision is internal or external and hence if it creates a favourable shareholder environ-
ment. The World Trade Organization reported in February 2013 that Japan’s inwards FDI con-
tinues to be low compared to other developed countries. There are of course many reasons 
why it is low in Japan. However, the corporate governance regime of listed companies has for a 
long time been criticised by foreign investors. Associate Professor and former MoJ officer Gen 
Goto explains: This gap between Japanese corporate governance and the monitoring model 
understood by foreign investors seems to derive from the difference in the understanding of 
the basic roles of outside directors and the board of directors.2
As seen with the electricity market, the reform process illustrates the state’s ability to push 
through reforms (in this case, to secure a better foreign investment environment among oth-
ers). Following the analytical structure seen in the previous chapter, the historical development 
of corporate governance will first be presented. Against this historical backdrop, the chapter 
will then explain the position of the state through an outline of the reform’s goals, scope and 
method. Thirdly, it will explore the reactions of Japanese industry as well as investors to the 
state’s initiative. Lastly, the chapter will compare the positions taken to the amendment of the 
Companies Act by the different actors with the state’s agenda as represented by the MoJ.
Three arrows cannoT be broken!
46
the corPorAte governAnce regiMe: BoArdS of directorS And ShAreholder 
relAtionS Before 1990
During the Meiji era of rapid industrialisation, the Tokyo Stock Exchange was founded in 1878. 
quickly hereafter Japan adopted several corporate measures shaping the organisation of 
Japanese enterprises. Most significant was the Commercial Code of 1899, which became Ja-
pan’s first integrated law concerning corporate and commercial matters. The law encouraged 
companies to adopt legally defined corporate practices and made it mandatory to employ 
at least one corporate auditor (Kansayaku).* The corporate auditor had the mandate to call 
shareholders meetings and was required to conduct both accounting and business audits. The 
corporate auditor’s primary function was monitoring directors’ compliance and proper execu-
tion of duties, thus having the mandate to sue directors on behalf of the company, launch 
internal investigations and approve given conflict of interest transactions. Because corporate 
auditors were required to be shareholders, the system naturally favoured shareholders’ power 
to keep company managers responsible for their actions.3
However, the shareholder-focused corporate system came under significant pressure dur-
ing the economic and political turbulence of the twentieth century. Following World War I, the 
Japanese economy was hit by a falling global demand during the 1920s as well as the Great 
Kanto Earthquake in 1923. This was followed by the Great Depression of the 1930s, a rural 
crisis resulting in widespread famine in the northern areas of Japan in 1931 and generally high 
youth unemployment. Parallel to these economic shockwaves hitting Japanese society, the 
country’s political environment was becoming increasingly unstable with both the military and 
right-wing movements pushing for war. In 1937, war broke out, first with China and later from 
1941 with the Allied Forces in World War II.4 
The overshadowing economic downturn caused by the Great Depression and demands 
of a wartime economy spurred further debate on the corporate governance regime and an 
Advisory Council was established. Notably during the wartime period the Japanese authorities 
had taken control of key industries, which reduced the standing of shareholders in favour of 
management autonomy. The State Planning Ministry (Kikakuin) viewed shareholders’ interest 
in profit as a hindrance to the interests of Japan as a whole. Subsequently the Advisory Council 
recommended that shareholders’ power of influence be weakened. In 1938 the Commercial 
Code was thus amended abolishing the requirement that corporate auditors be sharehold-
ers. In 1940, despite opposition from industry, the Cabinet, led by the military government, 
approved the New Economic System, in which it was defined that a company is an organic 
body composed of capital, management and labour.5 Although the Commercial Code was not 
changed further, much other legislation affecting the corporate governance regime was in-
troduced. The changes made in law affecting the corporate governance regime did not build 
on the positive perception of shareholders found in previous laws. Auditors however still re-
* The official translation for Kansayaku is ‘corporate auditor’ - Kansaku, 2012: 1-2
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mained a variable, though they were no longer driven by shareholder interests. The method of 
implementation was highly affected by the time’s military government. The industry concerns 
were ignored to a larger degree with the progression of the wartime efforts.6
By the end of World War II the corporate system had completely changed. As a business-
man returning to Japan in 1947 noted: “The interests of shareholders were dismissed entirely 
and business was run at the behest of the workers. It was the exact opposite of the situation 
I found in 1916 when I returned to Japan the first time. … Shareholders’ dividends, the stock 
price and the like were all given low priority”. 7 The corporate governance regime that emerged 
was now signified by increased management autonomy while shareholders had virtually no 
say in how the company was run. The strengthening of the labour force and management 
autonomy in the wartime years was not altered during the US occupation. Neither the Japa-
nese government nor the US occupation authorities saw any need to safeguard shareholder 
rights by returning them to their previous state. Even so, during the occupation period the US 
authorities did seek to alter the corporate governance regime. The Commercial Code, which 
was originally inspired by the German legal system, was again amended in 1950, now inspired 
by the American corporate governance model. However, the amendment followed the exist-
ing trend of reducing shareholder powers by heavily strengthening the position of company 
directors and their supervisory authority. Corporate auditors were stripped of all functions 
with the exception of accounting audits and the full responsibility for supervision of manage-
ment was placed on the Board of Directors. However, in 1974 the right of corporate auditors 
to sue directors as well as conduct business audits was again restored. Moreover, the position 
of these auditors was further strengthened in 1981 by the requirement that larger companies 
should have more than one corporate auditor. On the other hand, companies remained fairly 
internally run as it was not required for auditors to be independent or a shareholder.8
The corporate governance model, later known as the traditional model, highly affected 
corporate behaviour. Out of the post-World War II era a strong consensus emerged that com-
panies are best run by management, a viewpoint equal to the ideas presented in the New Eco-
nomic Reform of 1940. From this the idea of the community firm was born. The internally run, 
corporate-governance regime bred a culture that “the good of the company was the good of all 
its members and of the society at large”, as Buchanan et al puts it.9 This was also confirmed by 
Panasonic’s founder, Konosuke Matsushita’s corporate philosophy stating that: A company is 
a public Entity of Society. The mission of a corporation is to contribute to society.10 This general 
perception stemming from the military government’s ideas explains why the focus was on oth-
er areas than its shareholders’ interest in profit. Bjorn Kongstad elaborates: the company has 
been for the people working for the company, the people running the company, not necessarily 
for the people owning the shares or the stock.11 The wartime ideas thus became manifested 
in corporate thinking of internally run governance, where board members were promoted 
from within the company.12 The idea of the community firm thus signifies an organisation with 
strong common interests and values embodied in directors and how they interpret their duties 
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and responsibilities. Japan remains, to this day, one of the few countries in the world where 
independent outside directors are not mandatory for listed companies. The amendment to 
the Commercial Code in 1938 changed the role of shareholders and formed a corporate gover-
nance system that valued internal employees higher than outside shareholders. However, the 
bursting of the economic bubble in 1990 strained this corporate environment.13
corPorAte governAnce reforMS PoSt 1990
Corporate governance had not been an issue during the 1980s heyday of the stock market. 
However, following the bursting of the economic bubble in 1990, a stream of scandals and 
corporate bankruptcies shook public confidence in corporate managers’ abilities to supervise. 
The public blamed the immediate and wider economic turbulence on weaknesses in the cor-
porate governance regime. The emergence of the corporate governance debate after 1990 
was subsequently strengthened by the downturn in economic growth and radical decline in 
stock and real estate prices.14
The Commercial Code was again reviewed and in 1993 a revised code came into force intro-
ducing the Kansayaku-Kai (Board of Corporate Auditors) system.* The law now required at least 
three corporate auditors to be employed with at least one of these being an outside auditor. The 
* Sometimes shortened to Kansayaku
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term outside relates to an auditor who is not found within the firm, e.g. not an employee or a 
manager. But the term outside is not the equivalent of the legal term independent, this having 
additional requirements. The Kansayaku-kai Board, later known as the audit and supervisory 
board (see below), was established as a separate entity and today is what has been adopted 
by most listed companies. A senior manager at the Keidanren explains: Out of all 2,235 listed 
companies at the Tokyo Stock Exchange 97.8% have [the] Kansayaku system. So it is very high 
… we cannot ignore the value of the Kansayaku system, which is rooted so deeply into Japanese 
history and culture.15 The board system did add significant aspects to the Japanese corporate 
governance regime, though as is also noted the system has a deeper entanglement reaching 
back to the Meiji era’s introduction of corporate auditors and more significantly the later 20th-
century internal governance focus. To this end the auditor board implementation built on ideas 
of governance from previous reforms.16 
Against the backdrop of continued economic stagnation described above, the Keidanren 
voiced additional concerns about the corporate governance regime in 1997. In a policy state-
ment from September 1997 the Keidanren advocated: “The issue of corporate governance in 
Japan is now the subject of widespread discussion of various sorts. In order to maintain and 
strengthen their international competitiveness ... Japanese businesses must realize a form of 
corporate governance that meets global standards.”17 In particular the organisation recom-
mended that corporate auditors be strengthened both by adopting a stricter definition of 
outside to also exclude former employees and by increasing the number of outside corporate 
auditors. The more investment-focussed parties, including the MoJ, additionally pushed for 
the amendment to include mandatory outside directors. The Keidanren promptly issued a 
policy statement in 2000 strongly opposing the idea, stating: Introduction of outside directors 
[will result in] inadequate expertness and supply and excessive liability.18 
The community firm and its internal focus was still very much part of the corporate identity 
in Japan. However, the MoJ nevertheless put pressure on this model of corporate govern-
ance when they published their own recommendations in April 2001. The ministry did not per 
se deviate from the Keidanren’s position on strengthening the corporate auditors’ powers; it 
merely went a step further suggesting that all large company boards should be required to 
employ at least one outside director. In June 2001 the Keidanren chairman reacted strongly 
to this, stating: A little while ago the Ministry of Justice published a summary of legislation to 
make external [outside] directors compulsory … We feel that the issue of how supervision of 
management is carried out is something where every company will have its different approach 
that works best for it.19 The chairman additionally argued that Japan’s ideas of corporate gov-
ernance had historically focussed on strengthening corporate auditors, which was in line with 
the Keidanren’s policy proposal.20
In late 2001 the Commercial Code was amended, requiring large companies to have a mini-
mum of three corporate auditors in which at least half were required to be outside auditors, 
with a mandatory term of four years and able to attend Board of Director meetings. In addi-
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tion, the term outside was tightened to now exclude former employees. This was therefore 
in line with the Keidanren’s recommendations. In addition the law reduced the liability of 
directors and corporate auditors in shareholder lawsuits.21 To date, companies with Audit and 
Supervisory Board members are organised as seen above.
The Keidanren’s proposal was a compromise seeking to accommodate the pressure of the 
economic downturn. Following the ideas of the post-war reforms, the organisation recom-
mended changes to corporate auditors and not to membership of boards of directors. Despite 
the turbulent economic environment surrounding the 1990s and increased public concern, 
the Keidanren and the business community recommendations were prioritised overshadow-
ing investor interests.22
However, in April 2003 the corporate governance regime was expanded yet again, reflect-
ing the wish to include outside directors in the corporate governance mix. Companies were 
now able to adopt an alternative corporate governance structure: the Iinkaiosetchikaisha 
(company with committees) system.* Companies adopting this corporate structure are not re-
quired to employ corporate auditors. However, each of the respective committees, consisting 
of at least three members, is required to have a majority of outside directors.† The model was 
intended to separate the supervision and strategy of executive members (by directors) with 
the management of the business (by committees) as seen below.23
*  Sometimes shortened to Inkai system. 
†  A non-executive director, who had not been an executive director or employee of the company or one of its 
subsidiaries and had no executive appointments in the company or one of its subsidiaries. Buchanan et al, 2012: 113
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All three committees are placed under the authority of and appointed by the Board of 
Directors, though they are also part of the Board. The nomination committee is responsible 
for the nomination as well as the dismissal of Directors at shareholder meetings. The Remu-
neration Committee determines the remuneration of these appointed as Directors. The Audit 
Committee’s main function is to monitor management activities as well as report on these to 
the Board. From 2003 most shareholding, limited-liability companies were required to choose 
between these two governance systems, i.e. Companies with Audit & Supervisory Board 
Members or Companies with the Three Committees.24 The major difference between the two 
governance systems is primarily found in the source as well as the excise of authority*.25
All amendments presented above were embodied in the Commercial Code. Dating back 
to the Meiji era, the Code’s original format and language had not been modernised to reflect 
all these changes. Accordingly, in 2005 the Commercial code was replaced by the Companies 
Act,† which is the existing law currently under amendment. Managing Partner at Ernst and 
Young, Yutaka Kitamura elaborates: The existing Companies Act has basically two systems. The 
traditional system and the Committee System and to my understanding most of the companies 
choose the traditional system. … So this is kind of a trial and error process.26 The Companies Act 
of 26 July 2005 embodied most of the underlying corporate governance structures found in 
the former corporate law and still applies to all companies whether or not they are listed. One 
* See Appendix 6.
†  This was enacted in 2005 but only came into force in May 2006.
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of the core goals of the Act was to renew the language of the corporate law as well as clarify 
its interpretation. No changes were implemented to enforce mandatory outside directors.27
Despite several attempts by the MoJ and investors to introduce mandatory outside directors 
to the corporate governance mix, as of September 2012 only 2.2% of all listed companies had 
chosen to adopt the Company with Committees model. The changes to the Corporate Gover-
nance regime in both 2003 and 2005 did not alter the influence of shareholders significantly.28
By the end of the decade Japan was still at an economic standstill, with low levels of FDI, 
growth and inflation. In 2009 the Democratic Party of Japan’s election manifesto called for 
change in the corporate governance regime including mandatory outside directors, against the 
backdrop of foreign investor concern. The newly elected government proposed an amendment 
to the Companies Act to ensure healthy corporate governance and strengthen audits aiming to 
effect companies to fulfil their responsibilities to all stakeholders.29 On 24 February 2010, this 
led to concerns regarding corporate governance being raised by the Legislative Council under 
the MoJ. Here, the Minister of Justice, Keiko Chiba, stated: “In view of the important social and 
economic roles of companies and from the perspective of maintaining the greatest possible 
level of confidence among the broad scope of persons who have an interest in companies, 
there is need to review the state of corporate governance and the rules, etc., concerning Par-
ent and Subsidiary companies and I would like the Council to develop guidelines.”30 Notably 
the DPJ’s initial suggestion, making one or more outside directors mandatory, was removed. 
According to ACCJ member Nicholas Benes, this was due to the DPJ’s close relationship with 
the Japanese labour organisations. In contrast to the current ruling party, the DPJ was sup-
ported by the labour unions and their voice therefore had an impact. In April the same year 
an Advisory Committee was established to formulate recommendations on these concerns.31
Three scandals ThaT shook corporaTe Japan –olympus, daio and aiJ
The Advisory Council deliberation took 2.5 years to conclude due the triple disaster in 2011. 
Within a relatively short period of time, just months after the 3/11 disaster, three high-profile 
corporate scandals erupted, shaking the confidence of corporate Japan and resulting in greater 
public awareness of the need for an amendment to the Act.32 These were the Olympus, Daio 
and AIJ scandals. 
The Daio Saishi Scandal – October 2011
On the 28 October 2011 the Japanese tissue maker, Daio Saishi brought criminal charges 
against its former chairman and founding family member, Motohiko Ikawa, for borrowing USD 
140 million to cover a gambling debt. According to the company, Mr Ikawa ordered staff from 
seven of its subsidiaries to wire money into his personal bank account as well as an account 
belonging to a Las Vegas casino. Following the scandal the company’s share price dropped 15 
%. In a report to the TSE the company acknowledged the lack of corporate governance making 
it possible for Ikawa to order such large sums without the knowledge of its Board of Directors.33
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The AIJ scandal – April 2012
In 2012 AIJ, which managed funds for more than 100 companies, lost its registration rights 
after failing to explain inconsistencies in client funds. In April the president together with three 
other members of staff were arrested on fraud charges connected to USD 1.4 billion in miss-
ing pension funds. The scandal occurred only months after the Olympus incident and further 
emphasised the need to revise the corporate governance regime in Japan.34
The Olympus scandal – October 2011
The above-mentioned scandals were significant in their own right. However, the Olympus 
scandal was of such a magnitude that it overshadowed the other two significantly. AIJ and 
Daio can merely be viewed as an accelerant to the issues revealed in the Olympus fraud, which 
is likely to be the worst Japanese corporate governance scandal in modern times.
Olympus is a manufacturer of optics and reprography products. Before 2011 the company 
had not shown any obvious weaknesses in its governance model. The company had in fact 
transformed itself from being a declining camera manufactory into a successful manufacturer of 
medical devices, its global market share of endoscopes rising to 70%. In contrast to the majority 
of Japanese companies, it had appointed three outside directors to its Board. The Olympus 
story starts with the widespread problem in corporate Japan when dealing with a strengthening 
of yen during the 1980s, followed by dramatic losses at the time of the bursting of the economic 
bubble in 1990. Many Japanese companies, in the post-bubble era, delayed recognising these 
losses through methods of window dressing.* Despite the new accounting law of 2000, Olympus 
was able to circumvent it by buying controlling stakes in several small companies. From there 
the company shifted losses out of the Olympus group into these entities.35 
It is important to note that up until 2011 the company’s main business activity was quite 
profitable and the scandal came as a surprise. The accounting scandal was traced back to a very 
isolated and small office in charge of investments under the company’s Financial Department. 
The losses that had been shuffled around these entities were never disclosed to the company’s 
Board of Directors or shareholders. Management had purposely discouraged employees from 
disclosing any information about these activities. In April 2011 the English national Michael 
Woodford was appointed president. Though promoted from inside the company, he was the 
first foreigner in the company’s history to reach such a high position. In August and again in 
October, Facta, a small Japanese magazine, published articles revealing Olympus’ large losses 
in these small companies. The newly appointed president hired an external company to in-
vestigate these claims. From their findings, Woodford sent a letter to the company chairman, 
stating: It is clear that the current situation is now untenable and to move forward positively 
the necessary course of action is for you both to tender your resignations from the Board. Four 
days later, on 14 October Woodford was fired as president due to his management style.36 
* The method of window dressing – or, in Japanese, Tobashi (flying away) – is an exercise where bad assets are 
continuously moved to external entities and thus the company can avoid declaring its losses (Aronson, 2012: 89).
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The same day he broke the story to the Financial Times and brought fraud charges against the 
company under the UK Serious Fraud Office. By November several top managers had resigned 
their posts, the company was fined USD 100,000 by the TSE and its stock value had dropped by 
nearly 80%. Investigations, criminal court cases and lawsuits have followed hereafter.37
The Olympus scandal is possibly the worst corporate governance case in modern Japanese 
history, with top management concealing with the help from three company presidents loses 
of around USD 1.5 billion spanning a 20-year period. The scandal highlighted serious issues in 
the corporate governance regime that had been raised earlier by foreign investors. These con-
cerns have especially been related to the absence of independent directors and transparency 
in corporate decision-making. One Keidanren respondent elaborates: Foreign investors have 
been saying that the Japanese corporate governance system is hard to understand … there has 
been an effort to pressure Japanese companies [to adopt 2–3 independent directors], but they 
have been unsuccessful for many years. Then [the] Olympus scandal happened and that also 
triggered the change. But interestingly, as you may know, the Olympus scandal was triggered 
by an internal director. So in that regard he is not an outsider … Although it is the Olympus 
scandal which triggered this whole discussion, the Olympus scandal itself does not justify the 
discussion.38
Despite the Olympus scandal, accompanied by scandals before and after, a general agree-
ment has been that this has not had a huge effect on the Advisory Committee’s outcome. 
Kongstad elaborates: Olympus, you don’t talk about this [anymore]. … And there hasn’t really 
been a Japanese company [which has] said that “oh we think Olympus did something bad” 
… It is not necessarily in the press any longer. So no I don’t see there is pressure within Japan 
[to change].39 It did however highlight already existing criticism, though it did not necessarily 
change the mind of the Keidanren or other opposing actors.40 On the other hand it did win 
some impact on the discussion, as it clearly highlighted the limitations of corporate auditors 
and outside directors to monitor management. Here the MoJ added: the Olympus scandal is 
not [the] direct reason but we are now strengthening the requirement for outside directors. I 
think that this will lead to truly more independent outside directors and it will lead to stronger 
supervision by outside directors.41
Following the long line of scandals the Advisory Committee submitted its final recommen-
dations in August 2012, which later laid the foundation for the MoJ bill, submitted to the Diet 
on 25 November 2013.42
the AMendMent to the coMPAnieS Act
The Advisory Committee’s members mainly consisted of academics, lawyers, pension funds, 
METI, the MOJ and (most importantly) representatives from the Keidanren and Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. The last-mentioned actors respectively represented the industry and the investors.43 
In an interview last year the Ministry of Justice stated: one of the important amendments is 
introducing the … third type of corporate governance system. Some foreign investors point[ed] 
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out that the supervisory board system [the Audit and supervisory Board] has a big problem [as] 
the supervisory board members do not have boarding rights. … The new Audit and Supervisory 
board, all [members] are directors so they have voting rights.44
The Audit and Supervisor Committee Model
The new corporate governance model is a monitoring model based on the Company with 
Committees, though aspects of the traditional model are present. The Audit and Supervisor 
Committee is required to have at least three Board of Director members of whom a major-
ity must be outside. The model favours shareholder interests as it increases the number of 
outside directors as well as giving Committee members’ permission to express their views at 
shareholder meetings on dismissal, resignation and compensation issues. The main role of 
the Committee is to monitor management policy and to supervise the business activities by 
directors. The capabilities of the committee are therefore similar to the already existing Three 
Committees Model.45 Apart from a new corporate governance system two other areas are 
particularly relevant for shareholders’ interests:
stricter definition of outside directors
The amendment will include stricter requirements for outside directors, the role moving closer 
to the global standard of independent.* Outside directors may not be former or current em-
ployees/directors/executive officers of the parent company or any of its subsidiaries. Thus, 
outside directors are placed under the same requirements as outside auditors.46
Outside director: comply or explain
Listed companies without an outside director would be required to either employ an outside 
director or explain why the absence of such a director is appropriate. In other words, the 
Companies Act will apply a comply-or-explain rule to all companies. After the submission of 
the bill, slight changes were made to the original Committee recommendations. On 22 January 
2014, the MOJ explained via email: Under the Outline, these companies only were required 
to describe the reason for such an absence [of an outside director] in their business report, 
but under the Bill, they also need to explain the reason physically. (Article 327-2 after the 
amendment).† In addition Goto elaborates that reasons for not employing an outside director 
cannot be merely cost concerns or not being able to find a suitable person. However, the MoJ 
would consider enterprises with a complex corporate structure, such as Business to Business 
activities, to possibly have good reason not to hire an outside director. The MoJ further stated: 
I think that the comply-or-explain rule is relatively new to Japanese law, at least in corporate 
law and I think this is a challenge to our legal society. Whether this will work or not [is another 
matter]. Of course we believe it will work, but it depends on the practice.47
* The term outside or external does not reach the same level of requirements as independent which has been 
defined by the TSE similar to US standards (Goto, 2013: 19). For more information on the TSE definition of 
independent see TSE 4.
†  Due to reasons of anonymity this email will not be published in the thesis’s Appendix. 
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The bill is likely to pass the Diet in 2014, being implemented in 2015. The MOJ added, in an email 
from 22 January, that the bill includes certain reservations: Two years after the amendment takes 
effect, the Government shall reconsider its corporate governance in order to determine whether ad-
ditional steps, including a mandatory requirement for listed companies to have at least one outside 
director, is necessary (Article 25 of the supplemental provisions of the Amendment Bill).48
the relAtionShiP BetWeen induStrieS And governMent
The outcome of the Advisory Committee’s deliberations was a result of a compromise between 
a reluctant industry and investors eager for change. The state’s inclusive method in decision-
making meant that its influence was lessened, as the MOJ has stated: yes it is advice [given by 
the Advisory Committee], but this is really strong advice. We have to follow.49 The ministry was 
thus constrained by the conceded outcome of opposing members. During the Committee’s 
deliberations there was a change in government, the DPJ government, which had initiated the 
reform, losing to the LDP. Nonetheless, the industry-supported LDP government adopted the 
policy into its own Abenomics growth strategy. It is unclear how much the change in govern-
ment has affected the results of the Committee’s recommendations. However, if the MoJ had 
not supported a change in the Companies Act, it would never have been submitted to the Diet, 
Yutaka Kitamura concluded.50 A senior manager from the Keidanren further elaborates: mostly 
the pressure came from politicians. DPJ and some LDP politicians thought that the US style 
corporate governance system … is easier to be understood by foreign investors, because that 
style is more common outside Japan.51
The recommendations from the Advisory Council weighed heavily on the submitted bill. 
The deliberations were characterised by the Keidanren and industry on the one side and the 
TSE and investors on the other. Formally the Committee’s decisions were to be made by major-
ity. However, in actual practice, decisions were concluded by complete consensus.52 As also 
stated by the MoJ: There are no winners and losers, this is really [a] consensus … Both of them 
[TSE and the Keidanren] are really important and they are really powerful in Japanese society. 
So this is really consensus between two of them among more players.53 … this is just the lowest 
consensus of the discussion.54 
The position of the Keidanren before the Committee deliberations was as a senior manager 
explained: to make sure that we [the industry] can continue to use [the] Kansayaku system 
even after this discussion. And I think we were successful in that.55 The Keidanren has argued 
coherently that the traditional system has been adopted by the vast majority of Japanese firms 
and there is little justification to force companies to change to a more US-style corporate gov-
ernance. The Keidanren has though also stated that they believe it is positive that companies 
now have the option to adapt to a system that can better attract foreign investors but that this 
is their choice.56 
The third corporate governance model, like the Company with Committees, has been 
voluntary. It is not likely this new system will have that great an impact considering the past 
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unwillingness of companies to change. Kitamura explains: if they [companies] want to change 
the corporate governance … to strengthen the auditors’ power, they may change to this new 
option. But actually, at this point of time, I am not very sure they want to change to this new 
system.57
The main area of disagreement between the two parties has been the mandatory imple-
mentation of at least one outside director. In an email correspondence with the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange in January 2014, they stated that: we had two main objectives. … We are largely 
satisfied with it [the outcome of the Companies Act]. However, it is disappointing that we could 
not achieve (i) mandated appointment of an outside director and (ii) inclusion of ‘significant 
business relationship’ in ineligibility for being an outside director.58 Here the TSE is referring 
to the above-mentioned MoJ, DPJ and TSE proposals for requiring companies to mandatory 
appointment of one outside director. Although the discussion of this had been going on for 
more than two decades, the Keidanren remained constantly opposed. Kongstad notes: The 
Keidanren has never really been keen on this, never. Me, personally, I think this is one of the 
issues where maybe Keidanren shows its true colours.59 The Keidanren indeed also confirms 
the TSE’s disappointment but however stated: we think that we should let the market decide 
whether it is more of an advantage. … In order to force companies to hire outside directors by 
law you have to have stronger justifications other than: “this is easier to be understood for 
foreign investors” or “it is common outside the country”. Those kinds of reasons are too weak 
for us to change the corporate system.60
Despite many attempts from foreign investors and interest groups, especially the ACCJ, 
the Keidanren’s position has not changed. Notably, the EBC has not discussed or pursued the 
issues of corporate governance though it agrees with the ACCJ position. Here, Kongstad notes: 
Our focus has not been on cooperative governance. ACCJ, this is their issue. It is notably an 
issue for Japanese companies not acquiring investments rather than an issue for American 
businesses that ultimately can take their investment elsewhere, as Kongstad also notes.61
After a two-and-a-half year-long debate, the parties agreed on a comply-or-explain sys-
tem that notably had never been incorporated into the corporate governance regime before. 
Foreign institutional investors, the TSE, the FSA as well as the MoJ have indeed expressed 
concerns regarding the lack of independent or outside directors in the corporate governance 
regime. Even though the current amendment does not make it mandatory for companies to 
adopt outside directors, a gradual increase in outside directors is evident. According to the 
TSE, listed companies with at least one outside director has increased to 54.7%. That said, less 
than a quarter of companies with the traditional corporate governance model have more than 
two outside directors. However, outside directors are in general becoming more common.62
concluSion
The 1930s wartime era radically transformed the corporate governance environment charac-
terised by internally run companies. A slow process to change the internal-governance style 
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was launched in the 1990s against the backdrop of economic downturn. Several attempts 
by the MoJ, the TSE and investor-orientated organisations to implement mandatory outside 
directors have failed. The changes to the Japanese corporate governance regime have been 
characterised by a trial-and-error process that has slowly moved towards a more shareholder-
friendly governance environment. The outcome of the Advisory Committee’s deliberations 
revealed the minimum level of consensus found between parties and strongly indicates the 
Keidanren’s ability to influence legislators. The result of the amendment is a result of little 
external pressure and an unwilling industry. The scandals in 2011, similar to the scandals in the 
1990s, have had little effect on the deliberations. Additionally, the method of decision-making 
demonstrates how constrained the ministry was in its ability to push their own agenda forward 
and thus how the scope of the reform was lessened. However, it is worth noting that the gov-
ernment did tighten the requirements slightly, and definitely more than was recommended. 
To this end, it seems that the government is only constrained to a certain extent by its own 
method of implementation and, if ideas are presented as being necessary enough, they will 
be pushed through. From what we can see in the account above, the MoJ’s ideas for changing 
the corporate governance regime did have an impact. The corporate governance of Japan does 
indeed now reflect slow trial-and-error processes that have been accelerated by corporate 
governance scandals. The amendment to the Companies Act reflects a process driven by the 
MoJ and stalled by industry resistance. But with companies slowly but surely increasing the 
number of outside directors, even the Keidanren expects Japan to move towards the interna-
tional standard of corporate governance. As such, this will likely not be the last amendment 
to the Companies Act but the small step taken does show some progress. However, from a 
purely legal perspective the amendment’s voluntary nature does not imply any immediate and 
significant change to the governance regime. In short, the original intention of the DPJ govern-
ment and MoJ has been significantly watered down as a result of the state’s decision-making 
approach, lack of external pressure and minimal LDP interest to change.
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Getting back into the telephone booth and 
changing clothes
Whosoever desires constant success must change his conduct with the times 
― Niccolò Machiavelli
This thesis has focussed on the Japanese state’s ability to pass significant structural reform 
and thus to indicate the prospects for the implementation of Abenomics’ third arrow. Building 
on the observations presented in chapters 3, 4 and 5, this chapter will return to the thesis 
objective, which asked:
What are the Japanese government’s prospects for pursuing the third arrow of 
Abenomics through significant structural reform?
As noted in Chapter 2, the case study analysis has identified four primary areas to explain 
the constraints on the Japanese state and its ability push structural reform. These are the his-
toric forces pushing for reform, the decision-making method of the reforms, the reform goals 
of the state, and the goals and ideas of industry and other external actors when supporting or 
opposing the change.
This chapter has three main objectives. First, it will compare the results from both case 
studies in the four above-mentioned areas. This will in turn indicate areas where the state 
is constrained when pushing its structural reform ideas. Second, it will thus make it possible 
to discuss this comparison in the context of the wider Abenomics growth strategy. Lastly the 
chapter will evaluate how the analytical framework, inspired by Steven Vogel’s work, has 
shaped the thesis conclusions and in turn what limitations and benefits the analytical frame-
work has provided.
hiStoric forceS ProPelling reforM chAnge
The corporate governance regime and the electricity market are products of historical ties, 
structural shifts, evolving relationships and the scope and goal of deep legislative roots. Nota-
bly the goals of both reforms have centred on the same revolving issues: respectively, energy 
security and the issue of internally versus externally run corporate governance systems. The 
internal corporate governance model, which industry had initially objected to in the wartime 
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era, became the status quo for most Japanese companies (98%). The transition to management-
led companies began with the wartime state overriding shareholder interests and continued 
during the US occupation. Parallel to the change in corporate governance, there emerged a 
concept of community firms that did not per se favour shareholders’ interest of profit. The 
move towards internally run companies centred on auditor monitoring thus becoming part 
of the Japanese industry’s self-identity, as also noted by the Keidanren. The embodiment of 
societal responsibility in community firms established a belief that outsiders’ interests would 
not represent the core values of the company. Outsiders’ lack of understanding of these inter-
nal corporate values was also noted by the Keidanren not just last year but consistently. These 
historical roots of what is appropriate were not challenged until 1990. Similar indications were 
also observed in the historical development of the electricity market. The establishment of 
regional utilities in 1951 became the cornerstone of future reforms in scope and goals. To this 
end, the market and its associated reforms were shaped by the context of the ten utility com-
panies’ monopoly over production, distribution and retailing, which again were not challenged 
until the bursting of the economic bubble in 1990.
State control over private-sector behaviour certainly was a characteristic of both the corpo-
rate governance regime and electricity market. Initial reforms did to a degree break with the old 
ideas of the historical environment by shifting authority and power to specific groups: respec-
tively the main utility companies and boards of directors/managers. These groups have in turn 
fought to maintain their authority; this has materialised as the main area of dispute in post-
bubble economic reform’s scope. In other words, reforms since the 1990s have generally been 
characterised by the state wishing to break with old authority structures and industry seeking 
to maintain the status quo. Hence the state’s ideas of appropriate reform scope and content dif-
fered from past reforms, though not without reason. Whereas concerns in the electricity market 
prior to 1990 had lead to a nuclear strategy focusing on the ten utilities’ responsibilities and 
capabilities, the state’s ideas of electricity market liberalisation were introduced in association 
with government reform strategies after the economic bubble. In response, Japanese industry 
strove against this trend and prior to 2011 succeeded in significantly slowing down this liberalisa-
tion. Similarly, regarding the corporate governance regime, industry sought to follow long-held 
ideas of corporate auditor versus board of directors in which internal governance was still an 
embedded part of an enterprise’s autonomy to choose its own strategies.
The dire economy and the aftermath of corporate scandals following the 1980s heyday 
severely altered the state’s trajectory of change, pushing it towards foreign-inspired ideas of 
liberalisation and external director-focused monitoring. From the case observations, the burst-
ing of the economic bubble can be seen as a rupture point that has since propelled reform 
in modern Japan. But the subsequently slow pace of reform highlights how industry and the 
Keidanren have been able to affect the state’s decision-making ability. However, as the obser-
vations also indicate, the influence has not been one-way but rather incremental feedback 
loops have propelled slight reform changes in the direction the state has sought. Reforms 
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of corporate governance and the electricity market signified a struggle of different ideas of 
reform vis-à-vis tight-knit relationships between legislators and industry. Especially highlighted 
were the entangled interests between bureaucrats and industry within the nuclear village. 
This could not be seen to the same degree in proposed changes to the corporate governance 
regime, though the relevance of political party alliances with industry was clear in both stud-
ies. These state–industry relationships significantly affected reform outcomes and to an extent 
is a fundamental part of Japanese decision-making. 
The decision-making sTrucTure of The reform
The state’s decision-making method has been characterised by inclusive policy formulation 
via advisory groups, which does not seem to be a new phenomena. Industry representatives, 
academics and other considered experts on the reform area have been members of such 
policy groups and accordingly had a significant influence on the reforms outcome. Reforms 
that disregarded such institutional structures seem only to have been implemented in the 
period of military rule in the 1930s and ’40s; this was when core principles of corporate gov-
ernance were utterly changed. However, inclusive reform formulation strategies have been a 
key feature of the institutional structure since World War II.
As observed earlier, the Keidanren and the industry have been very successful in influenc-
ing reform outcomes. Time and again the same pattern has manifested itself in their responses 
to proposed reforms. Inclusive industry decision-making practices have significantly affected 
the scope for reform. Hence the state’s decision-making ability has in turn been limited by 
the conclusions made in such committees. However, reform outcomes have slowly moved 
industry in the direction sought by the state, though prevailing historical orthodoxies have 
hindered rapid change. In other words, if the state’s vision for change has deviated widely from 
the status quo, such as liberalisation or outside directors, it has had less chance of being found 
in the final reform outcome.
Naturally, decision-making by inclusive policy formulation has tended to constrain the state 
in its reform ambitions, these constraints are loosened in crisis situations where the state is 
faced by a weaker industry. Even here there are limits, however. For instance, the DPJ’s failure 
to push through energy reform was also due to its complete deviation from the accepted tra-
jectory of reform; pursuing zero-nuclear policy. In contrast, the corporate scandals in 2011 and 
2012 did not significantly affect industry players. This is mirrored in the amendment outcome, 
which saw a watering down of the original proposal, it being seen as unjustified interference 
with the traditional corporate governance system used by 98% of listed companies. Both cases 
highlight a significant point: the degree that a proposed reform is outside the historical reform 
trajectory can in part explain the degree of state influence over outcomes. In contrast, the 
strategy pursued by the state after 1990 was to liberalise or deregulate several sectors. To this 
end, energy liberalisation was easier to pursue as this strategy had been pursued gradually for 
over two decades.
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Of course, not all new policies fall within the accepted reform trajectory. The radical nature 
of the electricity market reform was in part related to the economic survival of the ten utility 
companies. In addition, weakened industry players certainly allowed METI to push its agenda 
forward more forcefully than earlier, despite industry concerns that are still being raised. It 
was also notable that METI faced severe public criticism after the triple disaster, forcing bu-
reaucrats to demonstrate their independence from the nuclear village’s tight-knit community. 
Historical developments can be important for the prospect of the reform scope, then, but they 
should be seen as a factor not an absolute. 
That said, radical changes in Japan are exceptional while adherence to historical trajecto-
ries is the norm. Whilst the electricity market reform seems to illuminate the strengthened 
ability of the state to push through its reform agenda, the outcome of government’s proposed 
amendment of the Companies Act showed its relative weakness. In the Advisory Committee 
deliberations, not only were there ministry officials pushing for change but also representa-
tives from the TSE supporting them. This was not enough; the lowest consensus between 
the parties prevailed. Not only was this a typical reform outcome but also it indicated the 
strength of industry to influence outcomes in their favour. The corporate governance reforms 
thus showed the same tendency that earlier attempts at electricity market reform had shown 
prior to the triple disaster.
exTernal pressure on The decision-making process
The difference between the two case studies is more than a matter of industry strength or 
weakness and the proposed reform being within an accepted reform trajectory, however. Ex-
ternal factors can also impact on the narrow decision-making arena and affect outcomes. 
The 3/11 triple disaster was a major rupture point for the electricity market, whereas the 
corporate scandals had no major impact on the corporate governance issue. The disaster scup-
pered the chances for industry, the state and other interested parties to implement a gradual 
reform of the utilities. The crippling of utility companies’ finances following the nuclear shut-
down propelled reform towards a far more rapid change than seen earlier. In the same way, 
the bursting of the bubble economy in 1990 was a traumatic event that drove the state to 
liberalise financial and capital markets in the face of a crippled industry.
Such external shocks as the 3/11 disaster are obvious examples but they are not the only 
ones. For the electricity market, the 3/11 disaster did not just disrupt state–industry relations, 
weaken the utilities and compel METI to seek more rapid change; it also affected industry 
behaviour significantly. As noted, companies such as Chubu Electricity, faced with a crippled 
economy, sought to benefit from the market liberalisation by expanding into other electricity 
regions. But not only did change arise in the immediate industrial sector; more significantly, 
external industry players began playing a role. The 30% loss in power generation presented 
an overt challenge for the Japanese state and the survival of the EPCOs but it offered an op-
portunity to outside companies like Softbank to enter the market.
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The trends represented within the electricity market in turn also highlight the lack of these 
with regard to the corporate governance regime. The participants in decision-making were 
only slightly affected by the Olympus scandal, which never materialised in the advisory com-
mittee’s recommendations. The outcome was, as in 2003, an introduction of a new voluntary 
system rather than a mandatory shift towards outside directors and a US-style model of corpo-
rate governance. Consequently, the pressure was minimal from investors and foreign institu-
tions to implement a mandatory external monitoring focussed on directors. As a result, the 
ideas of the state and TSE to adopt international standards failed to have a significant impact. 
Nonetheless, despite only a slow transition, corporate scandals have indeed been the initial 
driver of change. Despite the advisory council’s conclusions, the state still implemented (slight) 
additional restrictions on companies, compelling them to explain directly why no outside di-
rector was employed. Industry is indeed slowly progressing towards appointment of outside 
directors. As these increase in numbers, they may in turn act as another type of external force 
changing the behaviour of the industry through a slow trial-and-error process as represented 
in legislation. In short, the MoJ did achieve some limited reform but nothing comparable this 
time round with what METI was able to push with its electricity market reforms.
the StAte’S ABilitieS to PuSh reforM
The analyses presented of the two case studies have provided context-specific indicators of 
how to evaluate the prospects for the Japanese state to implement significant structural re-
form. The change in corporate governance and the electricity market highlight why gradual 
change was the norm and what differed when significant change accelerated. Accordingly, 
the interplay between reforms effecting industry behaviour and industry behaviour effecting 
reform is relevant in understanding the rationalities that constrain the state’s abilities to push 
reform. The lack of external pressure (whether this is from the public, outside industry or 
international actors) makes internal pressure on the state from business one-sided; the state’s 
ability to push different patterns of change than the status quo becomes constrained. As a 
result, the state’s ideas for reform have been implemented slowly unless accelerated by crisis. 
Interpretation of the severity of a crisis both by the public and by industry behaviour can affect 
the state’s abilities to push change. Significant change has thus been released by significant 
crises accompanied with a change in actor behaviour. 
Given the above observations from the two case studies and identification of variables affecting 
the state’s ability to push significant structural reform, the question remains: is Japan’s stagnant 
economy and over-valued yen of concern enough to push Abenomics’ structural reforms forward? 
The coming section will revisit the literature presented in chapter 3 in view of these findings. 
ABenoMicS And the ProSPectS for SignificAnt reforM
We have seen how the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy in 1990 was a rupture point for 
the state in both aforementioned reforms. Abenomics is to a degree also a product of this 
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rupture point. As outlined in chapter 3, the Big Bang reforms of the 1990s were implemented 
to counter the subsequent stagnant economy and strong yen. While Japan did indeed recover 
from the external economic shocks 1997 and 2008, the reforms were unable to dig Japan out 
of economic stagnation, a sluggish stock market and a continued strong yen. Although the DPJ 
government initiated policy to revitalise the economy with a new FTA strategy and an increase 
in the consumption tax, they were unable to implement the significant reforms needed to 
reboot the economy. In contrast, the current Abe-led LDP government, with a majority in both 
houses, has been able to inject optimism into the Japanese economy, weaken the yen and 
boost stock market prices. However, as also noted, the crucial third arrow of structural reform 
remains uncertain. The vague presentation of the third arrow has left the Abe administration 
open to criticism. While indeed the initially positive effects of Abenomics were the great con-
versational topic of 2013, this early success has not stilled criticism of the third arrow.
Chapter 4 and 5 indicated that it is not only the immediate industry’s willingness that en-
ables the state to push structural reforms in a given sector; external variables also affect minis-
tries’ ability to act. Assumedly the Abe government largely stands behind the scope, goals and 
method of its proposed and future reforms. The degree to which they will be watered down 
depends much on the state’s internal decision-making method and the strength of the spe-
cific industry with the highest stakes in the reform outcome.  However, in contrast to George 
Stigler’s perception, other external forces than industry– such as changed public opinion and 
criticism of the state as well as the degree that the reform scope follows the trajectory – affect 
the state’s prospects of passing structural reform in line with its ideas.  As such, the literature 
of chapter 3 can help illuminate the external environments reacting to Abenomics, interrelat-
ing to each other and thus impacting on the state’s decision-making ability.
Due to a mere 0.3% growth rate for Japan in the last quarter of 2013 combined with slug-
gish stock prices in the first month of 2014, there has been mounting doubt about the pros-
pects of Abenomics’ structural reform. However, on the other hand consumers and investors 
have grown faster than seen in the 3rd quarter of 2013. In addition, the announcement of new 
stimulus packages on 18 February 2014 sent the stock market prices up by 3%. The negative 
figures in the 4th quarter of 2013 were mainly the result of a negative trade balance despite 
the weakened yen. Even so, the general growth, weakening of the yen and increased stock 
market prices cannot dispel concern about the lack of specificity to the third arrow of struc-
tural reforms. The fluctuations in the Japanese stock market do not seem to be able to further 
indicate if Abenomics is failing or succeeding. However, short-term reforms seen in the first 
and second arrows will have to be followed by structural reform. So far this has been as vague 
in content as it has been broad in scope and pressure is building up for the state to be more 
explicit even as business interests mobilise against these measures.
As indicated in chapter 3, industry behaviour has changed since implementation of the first 
and second arrows. Not only has consumer spending and businesses investment increased but 
also the Keidanren have recommended wage hikes in the backdrop of the positive effects from 
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Abenomics. This in turn has prompted labour organisations to push for increased wages. The 
results of wage negotiations in May will further show if Abenomics is changing industry be-
haviour. Public and industry expectations, in the form of consumer spending, the Keidanren’s 
promotion of wage hikes and the changing market environment, give Abe some leeway. In turn 
such changes in market conditions have led major companies such as Canon to expect a 3.2% 
growth rate in 2014.
Although these mixed signals merely point to intermediate prospects, the indicators identi-
fied in this study can point to an overall assessment of the state’s prospect in passing significant 
structural reform. The Electricity Market Reform and the amendment to the Companies Act 
are only initial steps in what is presumably a long line of reforms. But by analysing the results 
of these two reforms, the following chapter will make draw this thesis’ final conclusion.
evAluAting the AnAlyticAl frAMeWorK
The analytical framework presented in chapter 2 has certainly affected this thesis’ results. One 
could question if the analysis’ conclusions are not merely a product of chapter 2’s prescribed 
assumptions and, if another framework was adopted, other results would be presented. This 
section will therefore evaluate if the analytical framework has served its purpose in this explor-
atory study and as such not confined the empirical data to fit within the lines of its prescribed 
assumptions but let it breathe.
The historic forces pushing for change
The historical forces pushing for change have been delimited to the individual case study’s 
subject matter. It is thus notable that the outcome of reform change has been explained via 
a presentation of the shifting historical relationships, legislation and structural conditions. 
Hereto additional focus was placed on industry and the state while the study also opened 
up to other external variables. The empirical data set, through this focus, highlighted the im-
portance of the individual trajectory of scope and goals from industry and the state as well 
as legislation that guided the analysis. However, the analysis also led to conclusions outside 
the assumptions presented in chapter 2. The case study analysis drew the connection points 
between these individual variables of trajectory change as well as identifying rupture points in 
the trajectory that additionally broke with or accelerated change.
The decision-making structure and external pressure
The focus on the decision-making method adopted by the state when pursuing structural re-
form enabled the analysis to focus on specific actors involved in the formulation committees. 
This naturally also delimited the analysis. That said, when seeking to explain how the state is 
constrained in its decision-making abilities, this focal area would be unavoidable. However, the 
analysis thirdly studied external changes in behaviour and structure that were evaluated as 
being significant in comparison to their trajectory context. With the historical forces of change 
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illuminating new variables beyond the analytical framework, the present external and internal 
factors were put into this new context.
In sum, the analytical framework did indeed guide the analysis and thus produced results 
within specific focal areas. The coming conclusion should naturally been seen in this context. 
However, shortcomings in the framework did not overshadow the empirical data’s results as it 
was possible to expand and allocate importance to variables in the context of historical trajec-
tory. In conclusion, the context-specific understanding of changing behaviour and structures 
enabled the analysis to expand the analytical framework’s initial variables when specifically 
studying Abenomics’ third arrow.
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Conclusion: the prospect of an unbreakable third arrow
I have experienced failure as a politician and for that very reason I am ready 
to give everything for Japan.  – Shinzo Abe
Once upon a time, reformers turned to Japan for legislative inspiration. These days are seem-
ingly over. Japan has been mired in economic stagnation, deflation, high public debt and many 
other economic ills since the bursting of its economic bubble in 1990. Successive governments 
since then have worked to kick-start the economy but with mixed success. Not surprisingly the 
current Liberal Democratic Party government led by Shinzo Abe has also sought to do so un-
der the slogan Restoring Japan. However, the economic growth strategy, dubbed Abenomics, 
resonated throughout the world when the economic stimulus measures of its first two arrows 
successfully hit their target, injecting optimism into the Japanese economy. The crucial third 
arrow of structural reform has been under close scrutiny since its announcement in June. The 
question remains if the state can hit the bulls-eye a third time to secure these initial positive 
effects.
This thesis set out to assess the prospects of the third arrow’s structural reforms by iden-
tifying the drivers and obstacles to Japanese economic decision-making at the national level. 
Notably any policy in the process from idea to outcome will often be subject to some level of 
ambition being watered down but of interest here is the degree that the state is able to push 
for change. Although much has been announced on these reforms, details have generally been 
vague and so far, because measures are being announced and passed incrementally, compre-
hensive information on the reforms as a whole is lacking. An inductive exploratory analysis 
using case studies was thus adopted.
The case studies examined in chapters 4 and 5 were reform of Japan’s electricity market 
and of its corporate governance regime. Their study was built on the analytical framework 
presented in chapter 2 and focused on the historic forces driving change, the decision-making 
structure, the scope and goals of both state and industry, and the influence of other external 
actors or events. As a result, a number of factors were identified affecting the prospects on 
third-arrow reforms. These are:
• The state’s preference for inclusive and consensus-driven decision-making.
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• Involvement of Japanese industry in most areas of decision-making.
• If the situation and/or attitude of the relevant industry has significantly changed.
• Deviation of the specific reform in scope and goals from its historical trajectory.
• Pressure exerted by public opinion, industry pressure and other external forces.
• Involvement of outside industry in the sector due to altered structural conditions or expec-
tations of these.
• Rupture points, external shocks and structural shifts forcing the implementation of change.
Obviously, these are not the only factors but they are the main factors proven within the 
scope of this thesis. From the analysis of the case studies in the context of Abenomics presented 
in chapter 6, these factors were distilled into four macro–micro variables affecting the Abe-led 
government’s prospects of successfully passing significant structural reforms. These are:
the degree of crisis leading to a rupture point. The 1990 crisis can be seen as a challenge for 
Japan’s economy directly leading to the Abenomics reforms. However, it was not as fundamen-
tal as the 3/11 disaster, as it merely changed the ideas and behaviour of the state, not those 
of industry. This conflict was illuminated in both cases prior to 2011, with the state seeking 
change on the one hand and industry seeking to retain the status quo on the other. As such, 
when evaluating if the level of crisis develops slowly (like the post-bubble economy) or sud-
denly becomes a rupture point (like the 3/11 disaster), it should be considered if it affects all 
actors impacting on the state both in terms of changed behaviour and resources. The triple 
disaster was of course an extreme rupture point, as was apparent from the devastating loss of 
life and huge economic consequences that followed in its footsteps. However, such extreme 
cases of rupture can help identify the nuances to be found in other cases of lesser crisis as 
these may take many forms. The economic stagnation and overvalued yen can indeed be seen 
as a crisis leading to a rupture point. If it has yet reached this point is still uncertain. However, 
a crisis without a fundamental rupture must still be viewed as a factor as it indeed affects the 
behaviour of industry (insiders and outsiders), the public and state. The question is if economic 
stagnation, an overvalued yen and maybe more importantly the threat of Japan falling behind 
other economic powers are enough to override industry concerns about opening Japan up to 
the rest of the world through significant domestic reform and free trade agreements.
changed attitude/circumstances of negotiating parties. As seen above, crises effect behav-
iour. Hence the finances of regional electricity companies were devastated by the triple di-
saster, weakening their negotiating position, whereas Japanese industry shrugged off various 
corporate scandals when the reform of corporate governance was proposed. When under-
standing the position of the state and industry in view of the third arrow as a whole, it was 
noted that the LDP government currently has a strong majority in both houses, strengthening 
its position in pushing reform. However, due to the method of decision-making, the question is 
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how willing the Keidanren and industry are to accept change and in turn how much have their 
resources been weakened by economic circumstances. As seen, in both cases the industry has 
slowly moved towards the state’s ideas of reform. This indicates that prior reform outcomes 
affect behaviour and this behaviour can in turn accelerate further change, manifesting itself 
in the trajectory of change. The question also is therefore if previous reform outcomes have 
pushed slow change in the industry to happen prior to Abenomics’ third arrow.
changed attitude/circumstances of external actors. Public opinion and the entry of outside 
industry into the previously closed electricity market were significant factors in reform of the 
sector. No external forces played such a role in proposed reforms to corporate governance but 
in the long term increasing numbers of external directors will bring greater change. External 
industry players and public opinion therefore can play a crucial role in determining the pos-
sibilities for the state to push structural reform.
deviation from the historical trajectory. This fourth point differs, as the trajectory of change 
is an incorporated element defining the first three factors’ degree of impact on state decision-
making. In addition, it can be seen that, in Japan’s inclusive, consensus-driven decision-making 
system, the more that reforms deviate from the historical trajectory of incremental change, 
the harder they will be for the state to pursue. In other words, the significance of change in 
legislation, structures, behaviour and resources is to be evaluated in its historical trajectory of 
change. This has been illuminated throughout the analysis and exemplified above. It is thus 
crucial to an understanding of the first three factors’ level of significance in the fourth factors’ 
context. 
As has become clear, the first three variables interact and overlap with each other, whilst the 
fourth factor is an integral element for them all. These factors help us understand the specific 
and current third-arrow structural reforms. Nor should we not neglect to consider the macro-
level reactions to Abenomics as a whole. Already it is seen that alterations initiated by the first 
and second arrows of Abenomics have changed the behaviour of industry, in turn affecting 
markets. The early successes of Abenomics have boosted consumer confidence and spending 
but also encouraged demands for wage increases. The question is if in future there is an ac-
celeration of change in public attitudes, expectations, behaviour and/or resources of outside 
businesses, labour unions, foreign trade partners and other external actors. Therefore, when 
evaluating future third-arrow measures and overall prospects for the Japanese government to 
pursue its structural reforms, these three macro-micro variables cannot fully be understood 
isolated from each other. The observed macro-level reactions to Abenomics as a whole and 
the above-mentioned three macro-micro factors impacting on specific reforms are both linked 
to the trajectory of change. In addition these factors will overlap and interact with each other 
just as they have already changed the behaviour of industry actors.
In conclusion, the observed macro–micro factors will determine if the LDP government of 
Prime Minister Shinzu Abe is able to create unbreakable reforms to secure Japan’s return from 
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several decades lost in an economic swamp. Time is not on the government’s side. The first 
two arrows indeed stimulated the economy and in turn the macro factor of changed behaviour 
did emerge. However, the third arrow of structural reform must be properly loosed before 
shifts in behaviour cause the reforms to lose their momentum and these positive feedback 
loops to turn into negative ones. One day, foreign governments might yet again turn to Japan 
for legislative inspiration; this is not the case at present. The question is therefore not if the 
third arrow can add the strength needed for the economy, as the Japanese folktale proclaims, 
but rather if the bow of these macro–micro factors can secure a third-time bulls-eye for Abe-
nomics.
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Appendices
“We are the other of the other” – Marcus Aurelius
Appendix 1.  Interview guides and interview codes
All interviews, apart from the one with Mark Manger, have been transcribed and thereafter 
coded into subgroups departing from the analytical approach presented in chapter 2.
Subgroup codes:  History changes in structural and market condition; history changes leg-
islation; effect of scandal/triple disaster; state reaction to shock; state involvement in reform; 
industry and Keidanren involvement in reform; external industry involvement in reform – public 
and/or industry actors; state influenced; foreign pressure; other changes; other actors; and 
other   
Interview guides on all ten interviews are found below. Note that questions have not nec-
essarily been asked in the order presented or formulated – in line with the method of semi 
structured interviews.
the electricity MArKet reforM
Questions for the keidanren: Manager, Environmental Policy Bureau – october 2013
1. Could you tell me about of the Electricity Market Reform’s background and current state of 
play? 
It is my understanding that the reform is a product of a long line of reforms attempting to 
liberalise the electricity market. Also it seems the March 2011 disaster accelerated this pro-
cess to ensure energy security. To my understanding the reform is implemented over 3 stages 
where the last stage intends to legally unbundle the market. This stage seems to be the most 
controversial part of the reform. To my understanding the reform was approved by the cabinet 
in April 2013, but did not pass the Diet before the summer break. It seems that the reform will 
be submitted to the Diet during the autumn? 
2. Why is it necessary to liberalise the electricity market? 
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3. What is the Keidanren’s point of view on the Electricity Market Reform? Are there any part 
which you are opposed to and why? I am specifically interested in hearing more about the 
Keidanren’s point of view on the liberalisation of the Electricity Market and the 3rd stage of the 
reform - legally unbundling. 
4. Which concerns do the industry and the Keidanren have regarding the reform and what 
would be the alternative? I am specifically interested in hearing more about the Keidanren’s 
point of view on the liberalisation of the Electricity Market and the 3rd stage of the reform 
legally unbundling. 
5. Which areas does the Keidanren support the proposed reform and why?
6. How has the Keidanren influenced or put their opinion across to METI? 
7. If the Electricity market reform was implemented in its current state, what opportunities or 
consequences do you see in the future?
8. How is the reform part of Japan’s growth and third arrow?
9. Do you believe that this reform gives Japan a positive advantage in the TPP, EU-JP FTA and 
other FTAs (also related to third arrow goals)? 
10. Is there other areas which you would like to touch upon or do you have any questions for 
me. 
Thank you very much for your time.
END
Questions for the ministry of Trade, economy and industry: Officer and Deputy Director 
Electricity Market Reform Office, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy – October 2013
1. Could you tell me about of the Electricity Market Reform’s background and current state of 
play? 
2. Why is it necessary to liberalise and legally unbundle the electricity market? 
It is my understanding that the reform is a product of a long line of reforms attempting to 
liberalise the electricity market. Also it seems the March 2011 disaster accelerated this pro-
cess to ensure energy security. To my understanding the reform is implemented over 3 stages 
where the last stage intends to legally unbundle the market. This stage seems to be the most 
controversial part of the reform. To my understanding the reform was approved by the cabinet 
in April 2013, but did not pass the Diet before the summer break. It seems that the reform will 
be submitted to the Diet during the autumn? 
3. What is METI’s role in the Electricity Market Reform?
4. Are there any parts which you have experienced opposition to or positive feedback on? And 
why? 
5. If the Electricity market reform was implemented in its current state, what opportunities or 
consequences do you see in the future, both domestically and internationally?
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6. Do you believe that this reform gives Japan a positive advantage in the TPP, EU-JP FTA and 
other FTAs (also related to third arrow goals)? 
8. How is the reform part of Japan’s growth strategy and third arrow?
9. Do you have anything to add or do you have any questions for me? 
Thank you very much for your time. 
END
Questions for frenk Whitoos: Vice President of ABB Japan and the Chairman of the European 
Business Council’s Energy Committee - October 2013
1. Could you tell me about of the Electricity Market Reform’s background and current state of 
play? 
Why is it necessary to liberalise and legally unbundle the electricity market?
It is my understanding that the reform is a product of a long line of reforms attempting to 
liberalise the electricity market. Also it seems the March 2011 disaster accelerated this pro-
cess to ensure energy security. To my understanding the reform is implemented over 3 stages 
where the last stage intends to legally unbundle the market. This stage seems to be the most 
controversial part of the reform. To my understanding the reform was approved by the cabinet 
in April 2013, but did not pass the Diet before the summer break. It seems that the reform will 
be submitted to the Diet during the autumn? My knowledge of the reform is therefore still 
superficial.
2. Have you or other European Companies been consulted or had indirect impact on the Elec-
tricity Market Reform? 
3. Are there any parts which you are supporting or are in opposition to? Why?
4. Which challenges does the last stage of the reform pose and it will be implemented?
5. I spoke to the Kaidanren. They seem very much in opposition to breaking up the monopo-
lies. How much impact do you think they and the Industry have?
6. It seems that METI wants to keep the legally unbundling part. Is this also your impression?
7. Do you believe it is more or less likely that the changes made will be watered down before 
2020?
8. In your experience how do you view the Keidanren has an organisation? What are their 
interests driven by?
9. In your experience, how do you view METI: What are their interests driven by? How are they 
influenced?
10. If the Electricity market reform was implemented in its current state, what opportunities or 
consequences do you see in the future, both domestically and internationally?
11. In your experience how does Japan deal with change. How can they change?
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12. What are the greatest barriers in general for change?
13. Do you believe that this reform gives Japan a positive advantage in the TPP, EU-JP FTA and 
other FTAs (also related to third arrow goals)?
14. How is the reform part of Japan’s growth strategy and third arrow?
15. What have been the main concerns at the [EBC] committee meetings?
16. Do you have anything to add or do you have any questions for me?
Thank you very much for your time.
END
Questions for the federation of electrical power companies: four Deputy General Managers 
and twp General Managers from the General Planning Department, International Affairs and 
Siting & Environment - October 2013
1. It is my understanding that the FEPC was established and represents the 10 regional power 
companies. I would firstly like to clarify this?
2. Why is it necessary to liberalise the electricity market?
3. What is the FECP’s point of view on the Electricity Market Reform? Are there any part which 
you are opposed to and why?
I am specifically interested in hearing more about the FEPC’s point of view on the liberalisation 
of the Electricity Market and the 3rd stage of the reform: legally unbundling. 
4. (additional questions from question 3) Why is the industry concerned in regards to legally 
unbundling ?
 4.1 Do you also have similar concerns regarding coordination, communication and energy 
responsibility as the Keidanren? And why?
 4.2 Do you agree with all the Keidanren’s 5 risk factors? And why?
5 If the Electricity market reform was implemented in its current state, what opportunities or 
consequences do you see in the future?
6. How would the Industry deal with the reform if it was implemented in its current state?
7. How does the Keidanren try to influence or put their opinion across to METI?
8. It also seems that the main electricity companies are expert members of the current work-
ing group. To this end I am also interested how and in which direction the industry wishes to 
compromise with the current reform draft outline? What agenda have you pushed?
9. How is the reform part of Japan’s growth strategy and third arrow?
10. Is there other areas which you would like to talk about or do you have any questions for me.
Thank you very much for your time.
END
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the AMendMent to the coMPAnieS Act
Questions for the keidanren: Senior Manager, Business Infrastructure Bureau - October 2013
1. How does the amendment to the Companies Act change the legal framework in Japan?
 1.1 What are the significant changes?
 1.2 How would it effect companies (it seems voluntary now)?
 1.3 Does this have any interest to foreign investors or companies?
 1.4 Is the change to Companies Act a step closer towards international standards (UK & US) 
of corporate governance?
2. It seems that the changes are adding to the current system, not abolishing it? Was this the 
original intention? 
3. It seems that the Companies Act has been revised several times, why do you believe that is?
4. What do you believe the Companies Act revision has been motivated by? 
5. It seems the TSE have been the advocators for a more ambitious amendment to the Compa-
nies Act - do they have less impact on law revision than e.g. the Keidanren?
6. The ACCJ and the USTR seem to have pushed for more independent outside directors as well 
as a clearer definition of independent. Have you taken this point of view into consideration 
(how has this impacted internal interests and outcome)?
7. How do you foresee the further developments of the legal corporate governance regime?
8. How are these changes connected to the current growth strategy of Japan?
9. Are these changes necessary in connection with Japan’s participation in bigger FTAs and the 
TPP (also related to third arrow goals)?
10. Is there other areas which you would like to talk about or do you have any questions for 
me?
Thank you very much for your time.
END
Questions for the ministry of Justice - October 2013
1. How does the amendment to the Companies Act change the legal framework in Japan? 
 1.1 What are the significant changes? 
 1.2 How would it effect companies (it seems voluntary now)? 
 1.3 Does this have any interest to foreign investors or companies? 
 1.4 Is the change to Companies Act a step closer towards international standards [UK & US] 
of corporate governance? 
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2. It seems that the changes are adding to the current system, not abolishing it? Was this the 
original intention? 
3. It seems that the Companies Act has been revised several times, why do you believe that is?
4. What do you believe the Companies Act revision has been motivated by?
5. What is the MoJ’s role in the Companies Act amendment?
6. Are there any parts which you have experienced opposition to or positive feedback on? And 
why? 
7. It seems the TSE have been the advocators for a more ambitious amendment to the Compa-
nies Act – do they have less impact on law revision than e.g. the Keidanren?
8. The ACCJ and the USTR seem to have pushed for more independent outside directors as well 
as a clearer definition of independent. Have you taken this point of view into consideration? 
9. How do you foresee the further developments of the legal corporate governance regime? 
10. How are these changes connected to the current growth strategy of Japan?
11. Are these changes necessary in connection with Japan’s participation in bigger FTAs and 
the TPP (also related to third arrow goals)?
12. Is there other areas which you would like to talk about or do you have any questions for 
me?
Thank you very much for your time. 
END
Questions for yutaka kitamura: Managing Partner at Ernst and Young, Japan – October 2013
1. How does the amendment to the Companies Act change the legal framework in Japan? 
2. It seems that the changes are adding to the current system, not abolishing it? Is this normal 
for Japanese legislation? 
3. Are these changes significant to the Japanese corporate governance regime, legally speak-
ing? 
4. It seems that the Companies Act has been revised several times, why do you believe that is?
5. How would it effect companies (it seems voluntary now)? 
6. Does this have any interest to foreign investors or companies? 
7. How do you foresee the further developments of the legal corporate governance regime? 
8. What do you believe the Companies Act revision has been motivated by? 
9. It seems the TSE have been the advocators for a more ambitious amendment to the com-
panies act – do they have less impact on law revision than e.g. the Keidanren? What is your 
assessment of the decision-making formulation of law?
Thank you very much for your time. 
END
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Questions for the Tokyo stock exchange – January 2014
1. Could tell me the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s position to the tentative amendment to the Com-
panies Act and outcome of the advisory committee in general?
What have been the TSE’s goals, ambitions and reasons for change, before deliberations were 
initiated in the advisory committee?
2. To what degree is the TSE satisfied with the outcome?
3. From the above, could you tell me which justifications the TSE have identified? 
4. One of the critiques of this tentative amendment is that directors at companies that use 
the new governance mechanism will not be held responsible even if the company incurs a loss 
through a deal involving conflict of interest, as long as the audit and supervisory committee 
approved the deal first. -do you agree in the above statement and do you believe that it might 
make potential investors hesitate?
5. Does the TSE view the change in government to be a variable for the less extensive revision 
of the Japanese Corporate governance regime, as seemed present in the 2009 DPJ manifesto?
6. What has been the policy process of this reform/amendment from 2010 to now? a. Is the 
interim proposal from the MoJ in December 2011, formulated by the MoJ with recommenda-
tion from the advisory committee? b. What happened between September 2012 (when the 
advisory committee recommendations were submitted to the MoJ) and 25th of December 
2013 (were the bill was submitted to the Diet)?
7. Which bearing has the Olympus scandal had on the proceedings and will the changes help 
hinder such scandals occurring again? – Why?
8. From my understanding the recommendation from the advisory committee also included 
a change in the listing rules. I apologies for my ignorance, could you explain: a. Can the TSE 
change listing rules without the government’s approval? b. Does the TSE consider the tenta-
tive changes to the listing rules to be a significant change for the corporate governance regime 
in Japan?
9. The Keidanren believe that this will have a significant effect on the corporate governance 
regime in Japan and companies will likely increase the number of independent outside direc-
tors. On the other hand foreign interest organisations and law firms have stated that they do 
not see any change to happen following the implementation of this reform. Which impact 
does the TSE expect to happen from this amendment and change to listing rules? 
Thank you very much for your time. 
END 
Note: answers to these questions can be found in Appendix 2.
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AdditionAl intervieWS
Questions Bjorn kongstad: Policy Director at the European Business Council in Japan – Octo-
ber 2013
1. Before we start could explain how the EBC construct their standpoint as a collected unit? 
2. From our conversation it seems that the EBC has not been active in the area of corporate 
governance, why is this? 
3. Has the amendment of the Companies Act ever been brought up as a positive or negative 
development?
4. Why do you believe the ACCJ has been active in this area versus the European commerce?  
5. Are the current rules on board of directors as a NTB? 
6. Could you speculate why the Japanese government is reviewing the Companies Act and if 
this would affect opening up the Japanese market/making it more transparent? 
7. You mentioned Benes as a person from the ACCJ which studied the changes to the Compa-
nies Act. Is the EBC in agreement with his views on the Companies Act? 
9. Can you elaborate on your views and experience of what overall changes in Japan on the 
economic and trade front are driven and characterised by.
10. It seems that Japan is currently in transition, both in terms of trade (pursuing more signifi-
cant FTAs), but also through the new economic reforms (Abenomics) – can you elaborate on 
these changes? 
11. What are these changes a result of? 
12. When following these different issues [economic, business and trade], how do you view 
Japan being able to change into a more open business environment? 
13. What main issues does Japan face when changing their markets structurally? 
14. What is your view on the new Electricity Market Reform: drivers, issues, opportunities etc?
15. Is there other areas which you would like to talk about or do you have any questions for 
me?
Thank you very much for your time.
END
Questions for mark manger assistant professor at the University of Toronto – december 
2013
1. Can you tell me about your work and your views on change in structural reform?
2. What has the literature told us so far on changes in structural reform in Japan?
3. What are the greatest mistakes made when conducting interviews in Japan?
4. What should an interviewer be aware when interviewing Japanese industry representatives?
APPENDICES
93
5. What should an interviewer be aware when interviewing Japanese bureaucrats?
6. How did you land interviews in Japan?
6. What lessons and experiences have you observed through your research?
7. Have you got anything to add?
Thank you very much for your time.
END
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Appendix 2.  Answer from the Tokyo Stock Exchange
<Question> 1. Could tell me the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s position to the tentative amendment 
to the Companies Act and outcome of the advisory committee in general?
What have been the TSE’s goals, ambitions and reasons for change, before deliberations
were initiated in the advisory committee?
<Answer> We have two types of objectives in participating for the discussions at the advisory 
committee. One is to cure the flaws of the Companies Act, which have become apparent after 
implementation of the act and the TSE rules cover tentatively. The other is to solve the prob-
lems that cannot be covered by the TSE rules. For example, discipline on third party allotment 
is categorized as the former, while to discuss the issue of mandatory appointment of outside 
directors is included in the latter.
<Question> 2. To what degree is the TSE satisfied with the outcome?
<Answer> We are largely satisfied with it. However, it is disappointing that we could not 
achieve (i) mandate appointment of an outside director and (ii) inclusion of significant busi-
ness relationship in ineligibility for being an outside director.
<Question> 3. From the above, could you tell me which justifications the TSE have identified? 
<Answer> Many foreign institutional investors demanded the reform. Although we accept that 
kansayaku system works well for compliance matters, outside directors, which have voting 
right on the board, would have further functions especially in facilitating business efficiency. 
We believe you can find the detailed rationale for having independent directors in OECD Prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance.
<Question> 4. One of the critiques of this tentative amendment is that directors at companies 
that use the new governance mechanism will not be held responsible even if the company 
incurs a loss through a deal involving conflict of interest, as long as the audit and supervisory 
committee approved the deal first. -do you agree in the above statement and do you believe 
that it might make potential investors hesitate?
<Answer> We think that the critiques are based on a misunderstanding. Even if the committee 
approves a deal in advance, the directors are still responsible for the deal. When there is no 
such an approval, directors are presumed to be liable. You should confirm this matter with the 
MOJ but not us. 
<Question> 5. Does the TSE view the change in government to be a variable for the less ex-
tensive revision of the Japanese Corporate governance regime, as seemed present in the 2009 
DPJ manifesto?
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<Answer> It could be. Please note that the cabinet has approved the bill of amendments to 
the Companies Act on November 29, 2013. You should contact with the MOJ if you would like 
to know the details.
<Question> 6. What has been the policy process of this reform/amendment from 2010 to 
now? a. Is the interim proposal from the MoJ in December 2011, formulated by the MoJ with 
recommendation from the advisory committee? b. What happened between September 2012 
(when the advisory committee recommendations were submitted to the MoJ) and 25th of 
December 2013 (were the bill was submitted to the Diet)?
<Answer> You should ask these questions to the MOJ but not us.
<Question> 7. Which bearing has the Olympus scandal had on the proceedings and will the 
changes help hinder such scandals occurring again? – Why?
<Answer> If you would like to ask a question regarding the legislative proceedings, please con-
tact the MOJ. In general, the scandal made it clear that a governance reform was necessary.
<Question> 8. From my understanding the recommendation from the advisory committee 
also included a change in the listing rules. I apologies for my ignorance, could you explain:a. 
Can the TSE change listing rules without the government’s approval? b. Does the TSE consider 
the tentative changes to the listing rules to be a significant change for the corporate gover-
nance regime in Japan?
<Answer> TSE has to obtain an approval from the FSA to amend the listing rules. We believe 
that the amendment will accelerate appointment of independent directors.
<Question> 9. The Keidanren believe that this will have a significant effect on the corporate 
governance regime in Japan and companies will likely increase the number of independent 
outside directors. On the other hand foreign interest organisations and law firms have stated 
that they do not see any change to happen following the implementation of this reform. Which 
impact does the TSE expect to happen from this amendment and change to listing rules? 
<Answer> Please see the answer to the question 8.
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Appendix 3. Name List for the Subcommittee of company 
legislation for the Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice – 
Translated from Japanese
(Current Date: 1 August, 2012)
NB: ○ mark indicates the Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice Committee
Chairperson
University of Tokyo Professor    ○ Shin Inwahara
Committee
ITOCHU Technology Ventures Ltd. 
Representative Director President  Toshihisa Adachi 
Hosei University Professor    Yuko Araya
Odelic Ltd President and CEO    Masato Ito
Waseda University Professor    Tatsuo Uemura
Public Utility Foundation of Japan 
Corporate Auditors Association President Junji Oota
Tokyo Region Court Judge    Yasushi Kanokogi
Japanese Trade Union Confederation  
General Policy Bureau    Chihiro Kawashima
University of Tokyo Professor    Hideki Kanda
Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc. Senior Vice President Masaki Sei
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation  
Legal Affairs Division Chief   Toyo Sugimura
Justice Minister’s Secretariat,  
Ministry Deputy Director-General  Osamu Hagimoto
Pension Fund Association,  
Managing Director Operations Executive Board Daisuke Hamaguchi
Ministry of Civil Justice Director   Yuu Hara
Lawyer (Tokyo Bar Association affiliation)  
Kyoto University Professor    Masahiro Maeda
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Secretary General
Doshisha University Professor   Yasushi Ito
General Secretariat of the Supreme Court  
First Chief of Civil Affairs Bureau    Katsuhiko Okazaki
Ministry of Justice Civil Affairs Bureau  
Civil Legislation Officer    Osamu Kaneko
Ministry of Justice Civil Division  
Commercial Section Chief    Yoshimitsu Kawai
University of Tokyo Professor    Hiroyuki Kansaku
Financial Services Agency Planning  
and Coordination Bureau  
Corporate Disclosure Section Chief  Teruhisa Kurita
Kyoto University Professor    Maki Saito
Ministry of Justice Civil Division Counsellor  Saburo Sakamoto
University of Tokyo Associate Professor  Wataru Tanaka
Nagoya University Professor    Masafumi Chuutoo
Chuo University Professor    Shuya Nomura
University of Tokyo Professor    Yukei Fujita
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry  
Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau  
Industrial Organization Section Chief  Satoshi Miura
Lawyer (First Tokyo Bar Association affiliation) Hideaki Mihara
Cabinet Legislation Bureau Counsellor  Hideaki Mori
Note: This is not an official translation of the original Japanese version. Certain sections may 
differ in writing style and/or expression style between this English version and Japanese. In 
cases where the author’s provided translation differs from original Japanese version, Includ-
ing, but not limited to, differences in the above translation: the Japanese version shall prevail. 
(MOJ 2&3)
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MOJ 3: Original JapaneseVersion 
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Appendix 4.  Translation corrections
intervieW fecP
01:00:
The Kaidaren wrote about the electricity system as a part of a big assemble.
In this assemble there are a lot of different things, among which the electricity reform.
When reading briefly, it looks like the flow of the assemble is not very smooth.
When you look at each point, we have fears/doubts, but we also noticed that the Kaidaren too 
had the same fears/doubts. 
16:13:
[After the last line you can add:] « They defininately have influence. »
16:39: 
[After the last line you can add:] « So it’s 7 people total. »
17:20
4 people represent the 10 big electrical companies, 2 represent newcomers on the market and 
1 represent wholesale.
Comment from Dimitri Delmas: I guess the « newcomers » means companies who have newly 
arrived on the market.
18:18
It’s too much with ten.
20:56: 
Comment from Dimitri Delmas: you can remove the « 3 things ». They don’t mention about 3 
things.
They just start straight about the subject without specifying how many there are.
28:18
We expect the prices go down and that stability in eletrical supply be achieved.
29:10
As the situation is right now,  there is one main player on the regional level that secures the 
supplying stability, and where other companies can enter the market. That situation al-
ready exists now, but only partially, or on specific areas, and we wonder if problems would 
happen if this situation was to spread and become general. 
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Comment from Dimitri Delmas: Here Sacha asks if there is a situation they would like to see 
happen, but the guy does not really answers the question. It’s kind of hard to tell whether 
he is just expressing what he and his team think, or if he is saying that he would like to see 
that situation happen.
32:20-5: 
It is more about the third step. To decide what we are going to do about it, we need time to 
evaluate the situation, based on/after examination of the differences between Japan and 
Europe. Indeed, due to the earthquake the public opinion is becoming more and more 
« strict 
Comment from Dimitri Delmas: The litteral translation of « kibishii » is « strict ». I couldn’t find 
a better word to put this, but he means that the people demand more strictness and rigour 
regarding  nuclear power I guess).
But the 3rd step has always existed up to now so I don’t think it is going to change much. nly the 
contents might become more strict but that’s it 
Comment from Dimitri Delmas: meaning that the pace with which it is going to be imple-
mented is not going to change or has not changed nor been influenced by anything.
38:51: 
Comment from Dimitri Delmas: After re-reading this section, there is a little change I would 
like tomake. When I say « medicine » I don’t talk about medicine as the science of healing 
people, but the actual medicine, the pharmaceutical product that is sold in drugstores etc.
39:15
It’s not only for the eletricity market. There has alsways been pressure between countries to 
liberalize their markets. Not only for electricity but also for many other industries, and 
comparatively, the pressure from other countries for Japan to open its electricity market 
is rather low compared to the pressure there is in industries like medecine or agriculture.
40:42: 
« e.g. ?komoshi? » <= That’s what you wrote in the paragraphe, but they don’t cite Komishi.
They only cite Softbank.
42:33-2: 
Comment From Dimitri Delmas: The part that Sacha translates is correct for the first sentence. 
She delivers the correct info. The only sentence you need to leave is: « They have never 
made offers to or received offers from the main player, so it’s hard for them to visualise 
that »
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The reason why she hesitated is because before answering the questions, the officials speak to 
each other/say things that are not really relevant. See below:
quote:« Are we in charge of that?... ….There is the 外国為替法 GaikokuKawaseHou (Foreign 
Exchange Law) that regulates the ??? (foreign capital?) …Regarding who can do what.... I 
don’t think TPP is in charge of that... »
As you can see it’s a bit messy. It’s only after that that they answer the actual questions, and 
just say that they have never received offers etc (underline sentence above).
45:28: 
Comment : Everything is good, except « They are probably going to preserve their old trading 
routes because they can’t really... ». Replace it by: « We have not really thought about this 
to be fair ».
AdditionAl reviSionS
Question 1:
 1:00 => Well, that part is a bit tricky.
When I first reviewed it, I came to the conclusion that Sacha’s translation was somewhat cor-
rect. There was obviously things she didn’t translate directly etc. but the overall meaning 
was the same. Then when I reviewed it for the second time earlier this week, I felt the need 
to deepen the translation a little bit.
But on the 3rd review, I realized that the guy’s speech is kind of unclear. He doesn’t go straight 
to the point, stops talking, starts again, etc.
Then, he finishes by saying that « we thought that, and realized that the Kaidaren was thinking 
that too (the par about the fears/doubts etc). » which all in all comes back to what Sacha 
said, namely « When it comes to the 5 points we agree ». 
Here is a literal translation of what he says:
« The Kaidaren wrote about the electricity system as a part of a big assemble.
In this assemble there are a lot of different things, among which the electricity reform.
When reading briefly, it looks like the flow of the assemble is not very smooth.
When you look at each point, we have fears/doubts, but we also noticed that the Kaidaren too 
had the same fears/doubts. »
As you can see it’s kind of vague and unclear.
I’ll let you be the judge about whether  you need to explain in details all the things he says or 
if only the conclusion is enough.
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Question 2:
« by 32:20 is that what you have written instead of or added to what is already written. »
Sorry, the way I wrote it in the previous document was unclear. Here is the final version you 
should use:
« So indeed it is a great push and it is a bigger reform, but at the same time we were okay 
with liberalisation for a while, we were okay before the earthquake, and we are still okay 
with it, we think that it is where things are going anyway. So all that was already happening 
until the second step. We have no problem with anything. It is more about the third step. 
To decide what we are going to do about it, we need time to evaluate the situation, based 
on/after examination of the differences between Japan and Europe. Indeed, due to the 
earthquake the public opinion is becoming more and more « strict ».
But the 3rd step has always existed up to now so I don’t think it is going to change much. »
intervieW With Meti
28:02
Basically, regarding the reform of the electric energy system, many opinions from people of 
various horizons can be heard, but we have not heard any officially opposing opinion.
45:30
First, we want companies with a strong competition spirit to enter the newly liberalized energy 
market.
45:56
During the 2011/03 disaster, it became clear that there could be  huge problems of cost, and 
that power supply is not always garanteed. As a result, with the new reform, we are hoping 
to find solutions to these problems as well as creating a dynamic energy market.
46:36
We want not only existing energy companies but also other companies to enter the energy 
market, and create a competitive environment that might lead to merges between compa-
nies, and of course will encourage innovation in services.
(Note from Dimitri Delmas: I don’t really know how to put that one, but basically what he 
says is that the primary goal is of course to create a competitive environment that will en-
courage innovation in services, and he also guess that phenomenon like merges between 
companies might happen).
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47:18
For the next 10 years, the Abe administration is expecting a GDP nominal growth of 3%, and a 
GDP actual growht of 2% a year.
51:10
We are expecting that companies in Japan as well as foreign companies entering the market 
will expand it (the market), and will thus contribute to economic growth.
Note from Dimitri Delmas: Be aware that economic growth is not their primary goal, but they 
will be happy if it does happen.
51:59
I can’t really tell if there will be direct effects/consequences, but I guess there won’t be.
52:16
Basically, the goal of this reform is to stimulate the domestic market.
52:30
Basically, even now, overseas companies can enter the market.
There is no barrier to enter the market
(Note from Dimitri Delmas: This is basically the opposite of what Sacha says. I find it kind 
of weird though because after that you go on saying that Japan is very protective of his 
market. Here is the Japanese: Kihonteki ni, ima mo, kaigai no kigyou no kata ga sannyuu 
suru koto ga dekiru ndesu yo.
Tokubetsu na sannyuu shouheki ha nai ndesune.)
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Appendix 5: Keidanren’s 5 risk factors of the 3rd stage of the 
market electricity reform
1. Risk of the stable supply of the electricity
 The Keidanren argues that if the generation/transmission sector is legally unbundled as well 
as if the generation sector is liberalised, there is a risk in investments not being secured for 
power sources such as nuclear. Given that nuclear energy is a timely and costly investment, 
the concern is that due to the high investment costs linked to nuclear power and the limits to 
developing renewable energy, the energy mix will rely on fossil fuels. Renewable energy, as 
mentioned earlier, has had a very low share of the energy mix and while the government has 
introduced feed-in tariffs to change this trend, there has been an issue of how to connect the 
grid to where the energy can be harvested and where the demand is placed.  In conclusion the 
Keidanren’s Senior Manager, Masami Hasegawa, adds: From the viewpoint of energy security; 
to liberalise completely, it depends on if it is economically reasonable or not, so it is very diffi-
cult to pursue the optimal energy mix.1 In other words it will be hard to pursue the best energy 
mix if it is based only on what is economically viable. The instability of renewable energy is 
the main concern for the Keidanren which thus cannot see how companies would be able to 
secure their investments. Mr Hasegawa adds: So how can we promote investment in such a 
kind of power generation plants? [i.e. renewable energy plants.] We don’t have any answer so 
far universally. Many, many countries are struggling to make such kinds of investment. That is 
the first risk factor.
2. Risk of complicating mutual cooperation among individual sectors, therefore undermining 
grid stability. 
The organization has highlighted that the coordination and information flow between the gen-
eration and retail sector (or demand side) is at risk of being compromised in a liberalised mar-
ket. The risk here is related to the increase in companies entering the market and thus more 
actors to coordinate in case of (say) a natural disaster. Senior Manager Masami Hasegawa 
explains: I believe that in many countries, again, they are struggling for how to manage such 
demand side and supply side [coordination]. And actually in the case of the European grid, it is 
easier to manage. But Japan is an island country and the grid is relatively small. So if the grid 
is small it is very difficult to absorb some kinds of change. Our companies [the utilities] have to 
operate more carefully than European companies, power generators, to adjust.2
3. Risk of higher electricity prices
The Keidanren see a risk that liberalisation could affect prices negatively. The organisation has 
highlighted that, despite the increase in fossil-fuel prices, the Institute of Energy Economics, 
Japan concluded that prices increased in Europe after liberalisation. It is therefore a concern 
that the same could happen in Japan. 
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4. Risk that electric power generation companies may encounter difficulties in procuring 
funds from financial institutions
In the case that the utility companies are divided into three separate entities,* financial institu-
tions would take a higher risk with both retailer and generation companies in approving loans, 
because the market would become more competitive. The concern is mainly directed towards 
the generation companies where the time investment in power plants cannot show immedi-
ate returns. From the point of planning to build to having a plant in operation can easily take 5 
years and even more. The Keidanren is there concerned that lack of funds towards generation 
companies could result in an energy shortage problem. Senior Manager Masami Hasegawa 
elaborates: To plan to build the power plant and then operate it, it takes 10 years. So if we 
realise that we have an electricity shortage it is very difficult to invest in it. It is too late!3
5. The risk of energy security and environmental stability not being secured 
As mentioned prior, a risk in increasing levels of fossil fuels that can impinge on Japan’s envi-
ronmental strategy and CO2 levels. In addition, due to the new energy mix, energy security 
would be at risk.4 
*  I.e. grid company, power generation company and retailer company.
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Appendix 6. Major difference between the Companies with Audit 
& Supervisory Board Members and Companies with the Three 
Committees
The source of authority: 
• The Audit and Supervisory Board is an independent body. Members are selected by share-
holders.
• On the other hand, Audit Committee members are selected by the Board of Directors and 
act under its control.5
The exercise of authority:
• The Audit and Supervisory Board’s individual members are autonomous and the board is 
therefore not considered a unified body.
• The Audit Committee’s authority and exercise of power is held by the collective body and 
not by any individual member.6
Notes
1 METI: 00:02:11 and Keidanren 3: 15/10/2013
2 Keidanren 3: 15/10/2013 and METI: 00:07:23
3 METI: 00:23:09 and Keidanren 3: 15/10/2013
4 METI: #00:24:25-2# and Keidanren 3: 15/10/2013
5  Lee, 2013: 8 and JASPA 1
6  Lee, 2013: 8 and JASPA 1
